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Using a Three-Dimensional Model to Understand Age Differences in the Framing Effect 
Tara E. Karns, M.S. 
The present study used a between-subjects design with three instruction conditions to investigate 
susceptibility to the framing effect among younger, middle-aged, and older adults. Participants 
were instructed to pay attention to the facts and numbers, to use their gut feelings, or to use their 
previous experiences to respond to two decision-making scenarios pertaining to treatment for 
lung cancer and a vaccination for a flu virus. Results revealed that, overall, the framing effect 
was present in the lung cancer scenario, but not the flu scenario. Instruction condition and age 
did not affect susceptibility to the framing effect; however, a frame by condition was identified 
for older adults in a flu scenario. The short-term survival information was more important to 
participants in the survival frame of the lung cancer scenario. Numeracy was not a significant 
predictor of the framing effect. Previous research has demonstrated mixed results concerning age 
differences in the framing effect. The current study further supports that there is no age 
difference in susceptibility to the framing effect and susceptibility may not be determined by the 
type of information that is used when making a decision. 
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Using a Three-Dimensional Model to Understand Age Differences in the Framing Effect  
 The framing effect is the tendency for people to make different and potentially less 
optimal decisions depending on how the decision options are “framed” or structured (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981; see Strough, Karns, & Schlosnagle, 2011 for a review). Despite the differences 
in frames, whether they are structured as positive or negative, gains or losses, or even survival 
vs. mortality, in a rational decision, the frame of the decision options should not change the 
decision outcome. The framing effect has been demonstrated in domains such as medical 
decisions (e.g., McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky, 1982), financial decisions (e.g., Mayhorn, 
Fiske, & Whittle, 2002), and most prominently in the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1981) 
using the classic “Asian Disease paradigm” (see Kühberger, 1998 for a review). The Asian 
disease situation requires participants to make a decision based on the number of lives saved 
(i.e., 200 people out of a total of 600 people will be saved) in the positive frame or the number of 
lives lost (i.e., 400 people out of a total of 600 people will die) in the negative frame. A close 
look at the number of lives saved vs. lost indicates that the same number of people will live or 
die in both situations. Despite this, people often make different decisions. The framing effect is 
especially relevant in medical situations where people are required to make decisions based on 
complex circumstances and numerical information involving short- and long-term outcomes.  
In the current study, the framing effect in medical decision situations was examined 
among younger, middle-aged, and older adults using a recently proposed conceptual three-
dimensional decision-making framework comprised of a deliberative, experiential, and affective 
condition (Strough et al., 2011). In addition, the influence of short- vs. long-term information on 
medical decisions was examined. Objective numeracy – participants’ ability to utilize and 
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understand numerical information (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009) – was used as a 
control variable to further inform possible explanations for the framing effect. 
Measuring the Framing Effect 
Stimuli 
 The framing effect has been examined in adults by using various different tasks ranging 
from computer-based tasks (e.g., Weller, Levin, & Denburg, 2011), concrete tasks such as the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; see Lejuez et al., 2002) and the Cups task (see Levin, 
Weller, Pederson, & Harshman, 2007), and hypothetical vignettes (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982; 
Woodhead, Lynch, & Edelstein, 2011) and gain vs. loss monetary situations (e.g., Thomas & 
Millar, 2012). The hypothetical vignettes range from business (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1986) 
and gambling scenarios (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) to medical (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982), 
and social situations (e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986). In the hypothetical vignettes, participants 
choose between a “sure thing” vs. a “risky” option and participants do not usually receive any 
sort of substantial reward or loss for making their decisions. The Asian Disease paradigm is one 
such example of a hypothetical vignette.  
 In the current study, hypothetical medical vignettes were used. Medical decision 
situations are important to examine due to their complexity and possible life-changing 
implications. Although previous literature has used a variety of different types of vignettes, the 
current study used the lung cancer scenario developed by McNeil et al. (1982) in addition to a 
modified version of that vignette about getting the flu. Using a previously established vignette 
addresses issues in the framing effect literature (addressed later) and adds more cohesion to a 
body of literature that has many inconsistencies.  
Measurement 
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Between- vs. within-subjects design. Frame (i.e., survival vs. mortality) has been used 
as both a between- and a within-subjects factor (e.g., Woodhead et al., 2011). Stanovich and 
West (2008), explain that differences in associations between the framing effect and individual 
differences  in within- vs. between-subjects framing effect studies may occur.  In a within-
subjects study, participants recognize the inconsistencies in the vignettes when they are given the 
same situation (with slight numerical differences) more than once. Participants in a between-
subjects study see the decision situation only once so they do not recognize a consistency issue. 
However, as Stanovich and West (2008) explain, this may result in a lack of associations 
between the framing effect and individual differences in between-subjects studies. Despite 
differences in consistency in between- and within-subjects designs, Woodhead et al. (2011) 
identified similar framing patterns in their between- and within-subjects studies. They gave the 
participants both frames (i.e., survival vs. mortality for lung cancer) of the decision-making 
scenarios in Study 1, while in Study 2, the participants were given only one frame (i.e., survival 
or mortality). Results revealed similar trends in the framing effect in both studies using frame as 
a predictor of decision choice. That is, in the survival frame, people had a tendency to choose the 
option with higher short-term risks (i.e., surgery) more frequently than in the mortality frame. As 
a result, people were more risk averse in the survival frame and risk seeking in the mortality 
frame. A between-subjects design in which each participant saw only one vignette of each pair of 
vignettes (i.e., cancer and flu) was used in the current study.  
Types of framing. In tasks involving a choice between a sure thing or a risky option, the 
choices made in the gain vs. loss frames are compared to measure the framing effect. The type of 
framing effect that is identified using this comparison is called standard framing (Reyna & Ellis, 
1994). That is, participants have a tendency to be risk seeking in loss (negative) frames but risk 
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averse in gain (positive) frames. Preference reversal, or preference shift, is measured by using 
data that is collected across trials (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People are more likely to take a 
gamble for a potential good outcome in gain frames but are more likely to choose an option 
which results in a sure thing in loss frames (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). For example, 
preference reversal, or shift, would be measured by examining the number of times that a 
participant chooses the sure thing in the gain frame and the risky choice in the loss frame. 
 In addition to traditional types of framing effects, resistance to framing has also been 
examined (e.g., Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). Resistance to framing is a measure 
of how resistant people are to demonstrating the framing effect. The resistance to framing 
measure is comprised of “risky choice framing” and “attribute framing” items.  Risky choice 
framing is presented as a single scale with the safe choice (or sure thing) presented at one end of 
the scale and the risky choice at the other end. Attribute framing refers to situations structured 
positively and negatively. In this type of measurement, each decision scenario is presented twice, 
framed either as a gain vs. a loss (risky-choice framing) or as a positive vs. a negative (attribute 
framing). For the attribute items, the person does not indicate a difference between two options 
but rather evaluates a quality of the item, such as the amount of fat in ground beef. In the current 
study, resistance to framing was measured using the attribute framing subscale of the Resistance 
to Framing scale (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). The Resistance to Framing measure (Bruine de 
Bruin et al., 2007) was used to ensure that the participants exhibit similar levels of resistance to 
framing at the start of the study.   
Explanations for the Framing Effect 
Affect Heuristic 
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Kahneman and Frederick (2007) examined neuroimaging data collected by DeMartino, 
Kumaran, Seymour, and Dolan (2006) and concluded that the framing effect occurs as the result 
of the use of an affective heuristic. An affective heuristic is a mental shortcut that uses emotion 
assigned to representations of objects and events in people’s minds (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, 
& Johnson, 2000). Finucane et al. (2000) describes decision making using the affect heuristic as 
a process that requires the decision maker to consult an affective pool. The affective pool 
contains all of the positive and negative emotions associated with the representations. When a 
decision has to be made, the affect heuristic is activated. The person unconsciously consults their 
affective pool for the emotional marker that is assigned to that particular representation and uses 
that marker to help make their decision.  
In terms of gains and losses, use of an affective heuristic causes decision makers to 
recognize sure gains as attractive and losses as aversive. As a result, decision makers are thought 
to demonstrate the standard framing effect, risk seeking in loss frames, but risk averse in gain 
frames (Cassotti et al., 2012). Cassotti et al.’s (2012) results are also consistent with the 
existence of an affective heuristic. After participants experienced a positive emotional 
manipulation, their susceptibility to the framing effect was eliminated. Particularly, positive 
emotion reduced loss aversion, limiting participants’ tendency to exhibit risk taking in loss 
frames, but it did not influence risk-taking behavior overall. However, susceptibility to the 
framing effect was not reduced or increased after a negative emotion manipulation. Cheung and 
Mikels (2011) also identified positive affect as being associated with risk-seeking in loss frames. 
However, in gain frames, positive affect was not related to risk aversion. In addition, DeMartino 
et al. (2006) identified a significant association between the framing effect and the amygdala, 
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signifying an affective contribution. These findings provide further support that the framing 
effect may occur as a result of an affective heuristic that occurs during an affective process. 
To investigate whether affect influences susceptibility to the framing effect, in the current 
study, participants were assigned to one of four instruction conditions: affective, experiential, 
deliberative, or control. Participants assigned to the affective condition were instructed to use 
their intuition and gut feelings to make their decision, which was hypothesized to result in an 
increased susceptibility to the framing effect. Because participants were instructed to pay 
attention to their affect, it was hypothesized that they would be likely to make their decisions 
based on negative affect in the mortality frame and positive affect in the survival frame, resulting 
in different decisions depending on the frame.  
Fuzzy Trace Theory 
 More recently, Reyna advanced another explanation for the framing effect. Reyna (2004) 
explains the decision-making process as being comprised of two representations: gist and 
verbatim. Gist representations are easy to access and contain an overall representation of an idea. 
However, they tend to be less exact, or “fuzzy,” in comparison to verbatim representations which 
are the exact depiction of an idea. For example, when faced with the classic Asian Disease 
paradigm, people who use gist processing may come to the conclusion that it is “better to save 
some lives than none”. Fuzzy-trace theory also holds intuition as central. When people use gist 
representations to make a decision, they are often relying on their “gut feeling” or their intuition 
to guide the way.  
Reyna and Brainerd (2011) concluded that the framing effect in adults is the result of the 
tendency to use gist processing rather than verbatim processing. Rather than carefully analyzing 
the details such as the numbers in a decision situation, people use the gist of the decision. As a 
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result, in situations framed as losses, people focus on the gist of loss and in situations framed as 
gains, people focus on the gist of gains. For example, when faced with the fatal disease situation 
framed with two alternatives to choose from (i.e., saving some people; saving some people or 
saving no one), people are more likely to choose the sure thing (i.e., saving some people). 
However, when faced with the same situation framed as a loss with two alternatives to choose 
from (i.e., some people die; some people die or none die), the same heuristic is being used (i.e., 
valuing human life) so people are more likely to choose the gamble (i.e., some people die or 
none die). Gists, while efficient and sometimes resulting in rational decisions, prevent people 
from analyzing all the details of the decision situation such as the odds and probabilities of a 
disease occurring.  
Prospect Theory 
The framing effect has numerous explanations that span from individual differences to 
biological explanations (see Strough et al., 2011 for a review). However, since the development 
of prospect theory in 1981, it has become, perhaps, the most widely accepted theory for 
explaining the occurrence of the framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Within prospect 
theory, outcomes are described as deviations from a neutral reference point. The deviations may 
be positive or negative (or gains or losses) with the response to losses more extreme than the 
response to gains. The value function is the term used to describe how a person’s response to 
losses is more extreme than their response to gains. That is, the negative feelings that occur in 
response to a monetary loss are more extreme than positive feelings associated with a monetary 
gain of the same amount. When demonstrating the framing effect, people tend to respond using 
value functions; that is, they tend to respond more strongly to losses than gains (e.g., lives lost 
vs. lives saved). Loss aversion, which depicts potential losses as being more influential than 
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potential gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), is another term for value function that has been 
used frequently in the framing effect literature (Soman, 2004). In addition, there is a tendency to 
overweight low probabilities and underweight larger probabilities, called the probability 
weighting function. For example, people underweight a 2/3 (66%) chance of gaining $150, but 
overweight a 1/3 (33%) chance of gaining $0 (Thomas & Millar, 2012).    
In the current study, participants who were randomly assigned to the deliberative 
condition (instructed to use the facts and figures) were hypothesized as being likely to exhibit 
loss aversion; that is, losses are more influential than gains. Because paying attention to the facts 
and figures highlights the number of people who die in the mortality frame (i.e., the loss), it was 
hypothesized that participants would be more likely to demonstrate the framing effect in the 
deliberative condition.  That is, participants would be more likely to choose radiation in the 
mortality frame (risk seeking) because paying attention to the facts and figures highlights the 
number of people who die (i.e., the loss). Conversely, participants would be more likely to 
choose surgery (risk aversive) in the survival frame.  
Age Differences in the Framing Effect 
 The research examining the framing effect in younger and older adults has yielded 
inconsistent results (see Strough et al., 2011 for a review). For example, Mata, Josef, Samanez-
Larkin, and Hertwig (2011) conducted a meta-analysis and identified younger and older adults as 
exhibiting similar risk-taking behavior for most of the tasks they examined. However, Mata and 
colleagues (2011) also identified an age difference in risk taking among younger and older adults 
as a function of decreased learning performance. When learning led to risk-avoidant behaviors, 
younger adults were more risk averse, but when learning led to risk-seeking behavior, older 
adults were more risk averse.  
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Furthermore, a study examining medical scenarios (i.e. the fatal disease problem and 
decision situations involving cancer) revealed that older adults demonstrated the framing effect 
while younger adults did not (Kim, Goldstein, Hasher, & Zacks, 2005). However, some previous 
research using only younger adults has demonstrated that they exhibit susceptibility to the 
framing effect (Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001) and in some cases, more susceptibility than 
older adults (e.g., McNeil et al., 1982). Conversely, a study that used a computer-based task to 
measure the framing effect found that the standard framing effect was more prevalent among 
younger adults (Mikels & Reed, 2009). 
Other research has found very little to no difference between younger and older adults in 
susceptibility to the framing effect (Rönnlund, Karlsson, Laggnäs, Larsson, & Lindström, 2005). 
It appears that when decision situations are framed in terms of risky choices, the adult age 
difference is not strong. In a series of decisions on gains and losses, Rönnlund and colleagues 
(2009) identified younger and older adults as equally affected by frames. That is, both younger 
and older adults were more likely to choose the certain option in gain frames and the risky option 
in loss frames. Similarly, Mayhorn, Fisk, and Whittle (2002) also found adults of all ages to be 
equally susceptible to the framing effect. To date, no research has explicitly used middle-aged 
adults as a comparison group to examine the framing effect across adulthood.  
As demonstrated above, the previous research on age-related differences in the framing 
effect is inconsistent. As a result, it is difficult to pinpoint a trend across the adult lifespan. To 
remedy some of the inconsistencies in the body of literature, the current study used younger, 
middle-aged, and older adults and vignettes similar to those in previous research (i.e., McNeil et 
al., 1982). To date, middle-aged adults have not been examined and using them as a separate age 
group helped to solidify a trend in the framing effect across the adult lifespan.  
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Dual-Process Decision-Making Theories 
  Judgment and decision making has been examined and explained in light of dual-process 
models comprised of two processes or systems: affective/experiential (Type 1) and deliberative 
(Type 2) systems (Kahneman, 2003; see Keren & Schul (2009) for a review of the different 
names for each system). The process of making a decision using the affective/experiential 
processing is quick, efficient, and requires less cognitive effort than the deliberative processing 
due to its reliance on mental heuristics, affect, intuition, or experience, among others (Evans, 
2008; Osman, 2004). The decision outcomes of the affective/experiential processing are more 
susceptible to biases and often result in irrational decisions. Deliberative processing, on the other 
hand, is more effortful and has a higher reliance on rules and formal operations and tends to be 
more accurate than affective/experiential processing. A function of deliberative processing is to 
monitor the affective/experiential processing, although intuitive judgments sometimes slip 
through, creating flawed judgments (Kahneman & Frederick, 2007). Although several versions 
of dual-process theories exist, most theories share some major commonalities such as the overall 
functioning described above and an interaction effect, in which the processes overlap and work 
together. Although the processes work independently they also overlap in some domains and this 
overlap may result in conflicting responses to some situations (Osman, 2004).  
Evans and Stanovich (2013) caution against referring to the two processes as systems due 
to the term's tendency to suggest that there are exactly two systems responsible for the 
processing. They suggest using the terms Type 1 and Type 2, which indicate that there are two 
types of processing. In addition, they recommend using the term processing rather than systems. 
This allows for the assumption that multiple cognitive systems may underlie the processing. 
Evans and Stanovich (2013a) also make the distinction between modes and types, whereas modes 
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are types of cognitive processing that occur within what is considered Type 2 thinking. Evans 
and Stanovich (2013a) define Type 2 processing (i.e., deliberative processing for this purpose) as 
"slow, sequential, and correlated with measures of general intelligence" (pg. 235). In addition, 
Type 2 processing is unique to humans in that it allows for "hypothetical thinking, mental 
simulation, and consequential decision making" (pg. 235). Type 1 processing (i.e., 
experiential/affective processing) requires minimal attention, lessening demands on working 
memory. It is also mandatory when stimuli that trigger it are present. For example, the acquired 
"waste not" heuristic. Although not necessary for Type 1 processing, execution has a tendency to 
be quick, central processing load is light, and associative. However, these qualities are correlated 
features and not required for a definition of Type 1 processing.    
Critiques of Dual-Process Theories  
Although research on dual-process theories is plentiful, the debate of the existence of 
these processes rages on. For example, recently, Evans and Stanovich (2013a) examined five 
common critiques of the dual-process theories. They highlight mistakes that others have made in 
their critiques, and redefine the two processes. Despite this reexamination of the dual processes, 
Osman (2013), Kruglanski (2013), Keren (2013), and Thompson (2013) reiterated their issues 
with the dual-process theories and countered Evans and Stanovich's (2013a) explanations and 
definitions.  
That being said, dual-process theories can be helpful when trying to determine how a 
person makes a decision, especially when attempting to explain how a particular decision-
making bias or error occurs. However, the critiques that have been offered make it clear that 
some issues with these models exist (e.g., Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski, 2013; 
Osman, 2013; Strough et al., 2011; Thompson, 2013). These critiques have challenged previous 
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research which often distinguishes between the two systems, making them appear independent 
(Keren & Schul, 2009). Keren and Schul (2009) cite inconsistent definitions of the two systems, 
faults in the previous research that describe the systems as separate, and undetermined isolability 
as evidence that the dual-process theories need to be redefined. Isolability is described as each 
system working independently to perform its designated tasks, with no reliance on the other 
system. To account for some of these issues, the three-dimensional model proposed by Strough 
et al. (2011) of a three-dimensional decision-making process was used in the current study.  
Commentary on Evans and Stanovich's (2013a) review of critiques argue that Type 2 
processes may also be triggered automatically (Thompson, 2013) and the completion of Type 2 
processes require working memory and are more flexible than Type 1 processes. For example, if 
a decision outcome is not one of serious consequences, a decision maker may disregard any 
additional thought even though they are not completely satisfied with their decision. Kruglanski 
(2013) argues that even though Evans and Stanovich (2013a) define the model as a dual-process 
default-interventionist model, it appears to be more unimodal. That is, Evans and Stanovich 
(2013a) describe Type 1 processing as being overridden by Type 2 processing when confidence 
is lacking in the judgment or when the cognitive ability is absent to reason about a judgment. 
This overriding process makes the system appear to be more unimodal than dual-procesing. 
Other commentators regard quantitative rather than qualitative differences in the two processes 
(Osman, 2013), vagueness of the definitions, and a lack of testable predictions (Keren, 2013). 
Evans and Stanovich (2013b) counter this last point by explaining that they were not describing a 
testable theory but rather a metatheory that does not have testable predictions.  
Three-Dimensional Decision-Making Model  
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In an attempt to lessen the issues with dual-processing models, Strough and colleagues 
(2011) described a three-dimensional model, in which three dimensions or aspects of the 
decision-making process (deliberative, experiential, and affective) are overlapping (see Figure 1; 
slight adaptations [a level of individual differences (age) and short- vs. long-term information 
have been added and decision domain, justification instructions, and investment amount and 
dimension have been removed] have been made for this study). In this three-dimensional model, 
the deliberative system is as described above: effortful and has a high reliance on rules and 
formal operations (Evans, 2008; Osman, 2004). However, the third domain is created by 
separating the affective and experiential systems. Critiques of the dual-processing models 
suggest that the two systems are not independent, lending to a degree of overlap (Keren & Schul, 
2009; Kruglanski, 2013).   
The current conceptual framework depicts the three dimensions as overlapping, 
demonstrating that it is likely that decisions occur as a result of the three dimensions working 
together rather than in isolability. For example, people often have an emotional reaction when 
thinking about a previous experience they are using to help them make a decision (Baumeister, 
Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007) and these experiences often have emotions connected to them as 
a sort of “somatic marker” (Bechara & Demasio, 2005). In this way, the affective and 
experiential processes are closely interacting. Furthermore, it is common for people to reason 
about their feelings when making a decision (Barrett, 2005), resulting in an interaction between 
the deliberative and affective processes (Strough et al., 2011). Similarly, people reason about 
their experiences, resulting in an overlap in the deliberative and experiential processes. In these 
examples, it is impossible to determine outright which system is responsible for making a 
decision without considering more than one system. The amount of involvement of the three 
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dimensions is one of degree, not a categorical difference. That is, in the three-dimensional 
framework, rather than determining if a particular system is used to make a decision, it is a 
matter of how much each system contributes to making the decision. In addition to examining 
circumstances under which the framing effect occurred in the current study, participants were 
also asked to indicate to what extent they used their deliberative, experiential, and affective 
systems, as indicated by instructions particular to each condition.  
In the current study, participants were assigned to one of four instruction manipulation 
conditions: deliberative (i.e., use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers), 
experiential (i.e., use only your previous and experiences of others that you are familiar with), 
affective (i.e., use only your initial reactions and gut feelings), and a control condition (i.e., make 
your decisions as you normally would). Participants were asked to what extent they used each 
condition as a manipulation check. It was expected that there would be overlap in the type of 
information the participants used in each condition, but the degree to which they used the 
information would differ, resulting in different decisions. Participants also completed the 
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and the General Decision-Making Styles 
questionnaire (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995). The CRT categorizes participants as either 
intuitive or deliberative decision makers. The GDMS categorizes participants according to five 
categories: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, and spontaneous.  
Dual-Processes and Age Differences 
Inconsistencies between younger and older adults’ susceptibility to the framing effect are 
also apparent when they are instructed to utilize deliberative and experiential processes, 
according to previous research (e.g., Thomas & Millar, 2012; Woodhead et al., 2011). In a mixed 
between- (instructions and age) and within-subjects (frame) design, Thomas and Millar (2012) 
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found that both younger and older adults did not demonstrate the framing effect when they were 
required to calculate the expected value of the situation or were told to “think like a scientist.” 
Thomas and Millar (2012) theorized that the framing effect was eliminated as the result of an 
indirect activation of analytic (deliberative) processes. However, when participants were 
instructed to use their “initial reactions” to make their decisions, they were more likely to 
demonstrate the framing effect. Based on the results of Thomas and Millar (2012), rational 
decision making may occur as a result of effortful, deliberate, analytic processing.  
However, Thomas and Millar’s (2012) results are inconsistent to those of Woodhead and 
colleagues (2011) if their manipulation requiring participants to “think like a scientist” caused 
the participants to pay attention to the facts and figures in the decision situation. (However, 
because instructing someone to "think like a scientist" is ambiguous at best, it is impossible to 
tell what participants were doing when making their decisions.) Woodhead et al. (2011) 
identified differences regarding the type of decision-making strategy that younger vs. older 
adults utilized when making decisions about framing situations. Older adults were more likely to 
use an experience-related decision strategy and younger adults were more likely to use a data-
driven strategy (Woodhead et al., 2011). Furthermore, participants who used the data-driven 
strategy (more typical of younger adults) were more susceptible to the framing effect than those 
who used the experience-related strategies. These results suggest that participants who use 
deliberative, effortful processes to make decisions (especially younger adults), may end up 
making irrational decisions, contrary to the results that Thomas and Millar (2012) reported.  Less 
susceptibility to the framing effect has been suggested to occur due to an indirect activation of 
deliberative processing (e.g., Woodhead et al., 2011) and the experiential/affective processing 
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(e.g., Thomas & Millar, 2012), resulting in an unclear depiction of when each system results in 
demonstration of the framing effect and adult age differences.  
Heuristics. One common assumption of dual-process models is that only the deliberative 
system results in unbiased decisions (Peters, Dieckmann, & Weller, 2010). However, heuristics 
(typical of the affective and experiential systems) are often used because they are efficient and 
result in favorable decisions. Heuristics are considered to be “fast and frugal” (Gigerenzer, 
2008). Heuristics such as “avoid waste” result in decisions that are made quickly, and can result 
in good outcomes (Strough et al., 2011). Experience can also lead to good decision outcomes. 
For example, as people age, their experience leads to gains in wisdom (Worthy, Gorlick, 
Pacheco, Schnyer, & Maddox, 2011), or “life pragmatics” (Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 
2006). This experience and knowledge may increase the likelihood of unbiased decision 
outcomes. In this way, the affective and experiential systems yield unbiased decision outcomes 
and these outcomes are not necessarily synonymous with only one processing system. As a 
result, older adults may make unbiased decisions using the affective or experiential system. 
Further research is needed to identify which system (including the affective system) 
results in the demonstration of the framing effect. In the current study, younger, middle-aged, 
and older adult participants were randomly assigned to an instruction manipulation group which 
cued  deliberative, experiential, or affective processing (separately) and were asked to answer 
framing effect scenarios about lung cancer and the flu. They were also asked to indicate to what 
extent they used information pertaining to each condition to make their decision. Consequently, 
it was possible to see if cueing a particular decision-making dimension resulted in more or less 
demonstration of the framing effect, if the instruction manipulation worked, and to what degree 
the participants use all three dimensions.  
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 Underlying psychological processes. Previous research has identified older adults as 
experiencing a decline in their deliberative processing (Peters, Hess, Vӓstjӓll, & Auman, 2007). 
As a result, they may be more susceptible to the framing effect. However, Peters and colleagues 
(2007) identified affect as being more resistant to the aging process and more influential as 
people age. This is thought to result in deliberative processing as having a weaker influence on 
decision making and affective processing as having a greater influence with age. Moreover, older 
adults tend to have more sophisticated affective processing than younger adults as demonstrated 
by evidence that people tend to process lesser amounts of information but focus more on the 
quality of the information as they age (Reyna, 2004). This focus on affective information 
requires the use of fewer cognitive resources than deliberation, lending to use of the affect 
heuristic (Peters et al., 2007). 
 People also experience a shift in the importance of emotional goals as they age 
(Carstensen, 2006). Due to a more limited time perspective, emotional goals are thought to 
become more important to older adults. In addition, older adults have a tendency to pay more 
attention to positive information (or less attention to negative information). Focusing on positive 
information tends to result in losses not looming larger than gains for older adults, as they do for 
younger adults (Mikels & Reed, 2009). Both the importance of emotional goals and attention to 
positive information of older adults result in an effort to optimize their current emotional 
experience.  
 In the current study, it was hypothesized that when older adults were instructed to use 
their deliberative processing, they would make decisions more like the decisions made by 
younger adults, and would demonstrate the framing effect as a result of the decline in their 
deliberative processing (See Figure 2 for a pictorial representation). However, when participants 
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were instructed to use their affective processing, younger adults would likely demonstrate the 
framing effect more frequently than older adults due to their less advanced affective processing 
and focus on losses as looming larger than gains. Conversely, it was also hypothesized that all 
participants would be less likely to demonstrate the framing effect when using experiential 
processing due to their use of outside information (their own or other’s previous experiences) to 
make their decisions (see Figure 2).  
Short- vs. Long-Term Risks and Benefits 
Vignettes used to examine medical framing effects typically contain information 
regarding immediate, short-, and long-term risks and benefits. For example, McNeil et al. (1982) 
gave participants three types of information: an immediate treatment outcome, a short-term 
outcome, and a long-term outcome. Some research indicates that the frame of a decision 
influences what type of information, such as the risks or benefits, short- or long-term, is most 
salient to the decision maker (e.g., Kim et al., 2005; McNeil et al., 1982). In survival frames, 
participants have been more willing to trade short-term risks for long-term benefits, but this has 
not been seen in decisions framed as mortality (McNeil et al., 1982; O’Connor et al., 1985). 
Woodhead et al. (2011) identified participants who use data-driven decision-making strategies as 
more likely to focus on the long-term benefits in the survival frame and short-term risks in the 
mortality frame. Moreover, age differences in the focus on short- or long-term information have 
also been identified (Kim et al., 2005). In their study, Kim et al. (2005) identified older adults as 
more likely than younger adults to focus on long-term survival in the positive frame but short-
term survival in the negative frame. However, this previous research fails to discriminate 
between the immediate and short-term outcomes. For instance, the lung cancer scenario provides 
participants with the likelihood of surviving surgery and radiation initially and also gives short-
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term information (i.e., rate of survival after one month). Kim et al. (2005) and Woodhead et al. 
(2011) considered the immediate and short-term outcomes as short-term information, making it 
impossible to tell what is most important to the participants’ decision-making process: the 
immediate outcome or the short-term risks of the decision situation.  
In the current study, participants were asked to rate how important the short- and long-
term information was to their decision, without the confounding immediate information. In 
addition, participants completed the Consideration of Future Consequences scale (Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) as a means of measuring the participants’ consideration 
of the consequences of their potential behaviors. Together, these measures granted the 
opportunity to examine the importance of short- vs. long-term information and future 
consequences with regards to the framing effect and age. 
Numeracy and the Framing Effect 
 Factors that may influence susceptibility to the framing effect, such as intelligence 
(Parker & Fischhoff, 2005), expertise (Loke & Tan, 1992), need for cognition (Levin, Gaeth, 
Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002), and numeracy (Peters et al., 2006) have been examined. Numeracy 
is an individual difference factor that has been examined and identified as making people more 
susceptible to the framing effect (Peters et al., 2006). Numeracy is broadly defined as “the ability 
to understand and use numerical information” (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009, p. 
943).  
In decision-making scenarios, particularly medical decisions, numerical information is 
often used to present frequencies and probabilities of an event occurring. For example, a 
probability that people will live or die such as the one given in the Asian Disease problem: 
"There is a one-third probability that nobody will die, and a two-third probability that 600 people 
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will die" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People tend to range in their abilities to understand and 
use numerical information. Those low in numeracy have a tendency to be more susceptible to the 
framing effect, biases in judgment and decision making, and reduced compliance to medical 
directions (Lipkus, 2007; Reyna et al., 2009). Another factor to consider is that low numeracy is 
not only found among people who are low in intelligence (Reyna et al., 2009) and it has been 
cited as being related but separate from general intelligence (Peters, 2012). For example, 
accountants who were experiencing cognitive decline in memory associated with non-numerical 
information and retired bookkeepers with no cognitive decline were identified as having similar 
levels of numeracy (Castel, 2007). Peters cites many research studies which used SAT scores as 
a control resulting in an enduring significant effect of numeracy.  
The numerical information may also lead people to determine the credibility of the risk 
information based on how accurate, relevant, useful, clear, and easy it is to understand (Lipkus, 
2007). Furthermore, numbers often lack the sensitivity to trigger automatic reactions and 
intuition, preventing the use of deliberative processing. However, people often have difficulty 
understanding and applying necessary mathematical equations or concepts (such as converting 
decimals to percentages, etc.) (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001; Woloshin, Schwartz, Moncur, 
Gabriel, & Tosteson, 2001), leading to an increased susceptibility to demonstrating the framing 
effect. Despite this research, it is a common assumption that people are adept at using numbers 
and appreciate their value as a result of their education and daily use (Lipkus, 2007). 
In spite of the research demonstrating a lack of numerical ability, the literature used to 
educate people on decision making indicates that people should pay close attention to the facts 
and figures in the decision situation (Thompson, 2004; Wargo, 2008). Current recommendations 
are to explain quantities such as the short-term risk of a treatment in a qualitative manner, 
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display numerical information pictorially, and to cue the retrieval of health-related knowledge 
(Wargo, 2008). This consideration is important especially for complex decisions such as medical 
decisions due to the occurrence of numerical values and probabilities presented in medical 
decisions. However, Woodhead and colleagues’ (2011) results demonstrating the framing effect 
when deliberation was used suggest that it may be inappropriate to encourage people to use the 
data in the decision situations to make their decisions. Furthermore, the research on numeracy 
indicates that most people are not good with numbers. Together, these factors suggest that it is 
important to investigate numeracy as a factor that contributes to the framing effect. 
 In the present study, numeracy was evaluated as a control variable. Because studies on 
decision making often use vignettes containing numerical values and require simple 
mathematical procedures, numeracy is an important topic to evaluate. Furthermore, using 
numeracy as a covariate helped control for individual differences in numerical ability.  
Summary 
 Because the research regarding adult age differences in the framing effect has continued 
to yield inconsistent results, the current study examined younger, middle-aged, and older adults’ 
susceptibility to the framing effect. In addition, there has not been a clear distinction in 
susceptibility to the framing effect with regards to the use of deliberative and 
affective/experiential processing. The present study separated affective and experiential 
processing by using an instruction manipulation to cue deliberative, affective, or experiential 
processing. Moreover, participants were asked to indicate whether the short- or long-term 
information was most salient to their decision making. Participants’ consideration of future 
consequences was also measured to investigate whether their focus on short- or long-term 
information is related to how they consider future consequences of their behaviors. In addition, 
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numeracy has been identified as a potential factor that makes people more susceptible to the 
framing effect. Using numeracy as a covariate eliminated it as an individual-difference variable 
that may affect participants’ susceptibility to the framing effect. 
 The current study is innovative in that it is the first of its kind to examine the framing 
effect using a three-dimensional decision-making framework. The current study also sought to 
resolve the inconsistencies in the literature regarding age differences in demonstration of the 
framing effect. Moreover, the current study eliminated the confound between immediate and 
short-term information to more thoroughly examine the influence of short- vs. long-term 
information. 
Statement of the Problem 
Previous research has identified differences in susceptibility to the framing effect 
depending on the type of processing (Thomas & Millar, 2012) and decision-making strategy that 
is used (Woodhead et al., 2011). Although the framing effect has been examined extensively, 
results regarding age differences remain inconsistent. As a result and in light of the recent 
research suggesting differences in susceptibility to the framing effect depending on whether 
deliberative or experiential processing is activated, age differences should be examined more 
thoroughly. Furthermore, a third dimension, the role of affective processing, needs to be better 
understood because age differences in affect regulation are becoming increasingly well-
documented.  
The current study is novel in that it included an instruction manipulation that instructed 
younger, middle-aged, and older adult participants to either use only logic and reasoning based 
on the facts and numbers (deliberative processing), to use only their initial reactions and gut 
feelings (affective processing), or to use only their previous experiences and experiences of 
AGE DIFFERENCES IN THE FRAMING EFFECT 23 
 
 
others (experiential processing) to come to a decision. Some recommendations for making 
rational medical decisions explain that people should use the data in the decision-making 
scenario to make a rational decision (Thompson, 2004; Wargo, 2008). The results Thomas and 
Millar (2012) found are counter to this practice. The current study manipulated the type of 
information that participants were to pay attention, allowing an exploration into what type of 
processing is most reliable. Furthermore, by including age as a predictor, more information was 
obtained regarding the type of information that is most pertinent to younger, middle-aged, and 
older adults. In addition, an age-related difference in susceptibility to the framing effect was also 
examined, a trend that, at this point, has failed to be determined. 
Furthermore, by including age as a predictor, more information pertaining to the type of 
information pertinent to each age group was identified in addition to which age group is more 
susceptible to the framing effect, a trend that has yet to be determined.  
 Previous research has also identified differences in the influence of short- vs. long-term 
information, but has failed to distinguish between the immediate outcomes and the short-term 
outcomes of the decision-making situation (Kim et al., 2005; Woodhead et al., 2011). The 
current study addressed this issue by eliminating the immediate outcomes from the decision-
making situation to focus on the difference between the short- and long-term outcomes. It was 
expected that the frame of the decision situation would influence what type of information 
(short- vs. long-term) is most salient to the decision maker. It was the goal of the current study to 
contribute to the literature by examining the information that is most influential to participants 
when deliberation, affect, and experience are cued.  
Additionally, people low in numeracy have been identified as less able to make rational 
decisions and more susceptible to the framing effect (Peters, 2012). Because medical decisions 
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are complex and often contain numerous numerical values and require an understanding of 
probabilities and odds, numeracy was measured and used as a covariate. The current study 
further investigated how objective numeracy affected susceptibility to the framing effect in light 
of deliberation, experience, and affect. Participants who have low numeracy were likely to be 
more susceptible to demonstrating the framing effect, especially those instructed to use 
deliberation (i.e., pay attention to the facts and figures).  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question 1 
 Do younger, middle-aged, or older adults in the deliberative, affective, or experiential 
conditions demonstrate the framing effect more frequently? 
 Hypothesis 1a. Woodhead et al. (2011) identified participants who use data-driven 
decision-making strategies as more likely to demonstrate the framing effect. Based on these 
results, participants in the deliberative condition were hypothesized to be more likely to 
demonstrate the framing effect than participants in the affective or experiential conditions.  
 Hypothesis 1b. Woodhead et al. (2011) identified younger adults as using data-driven 
strategies more frequently than older adults. Reyna (2004) identified older adults as having a 
more sophisticated affective system. In the current study, younger adults in the deliberative and 
affective conditions were hypothesized to demonstrate the framing effect more frequently than 
younger adults in the experiential condition. 
 Hypothesis 1c. Based on Woodhead et al. (2011), older adults in the deliberative 
condition were hypothesized to be more likely to demonstrate the framing effect than older 
adults in the experiential and affective conditions. 
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Hypothesis 1d. Because affect becomes more influential as people age (Peters et al., 
2007) and the affective system becomes more sophisticated with age (Reyna, 2004), older adults 
in the affective system were hypothesized to demonstrate the framing effect less frequently than 
younger adults in the affective condition.  
Research Question 2  
Are the short-term risks or long-term benefits more influential to decisions among 
younger, middle-aged, or older adults in the survival or mortality (or flu or no flu) frame 
depending on the instruction manipulation (deliberative, affective, or experiential)? 
 Hypothesis 2a. Woodhead et al. (2011) identified participants who use data-driven 
strategies as more likely to focus on the long-term benefits in the survival frame and short-term 
risks in the mortality frame. Drawing from these results, in the current study, participants’ 
decisions were hypothesized to be influenced more by the short-term information in the mortality 
(or getting the flu) frame and by the long-term information in the survival (or not getting the flu) 
frame when instructed to use their deliberative system.  
 Hypothesis 2b. Kim et al. (2005) identified older adults as more likely than younger 
adults to focus on long-term survival in the positive frame. In the current study, the long-term 
information in the survival (or not getting the flu) frame was hypothesized to influence older 
adults’ decisions more than younger and middle-aged adults.   
 Hypothesis 2c. Kim et al. (2005) also identified older adults as being more likely than 
younger adults to focus on short-term survival in the negative frame. Based on these results, the 
short-term information in the mortality (or getting the flu) frame was hypothesized to influence 
older adults' decisions more than younger and middle-aged adults. 
Research Question 3 
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 Does numeracy affect susceptibility to the framing effect among younger, middle-aged, 
and older adults when instructed to use the deliberative, affective, or experiential system?  
 Hypothesis 3. Peters et al. (2006) identified participants who are lower in numeracy as 
more susceptible to the framing effect. As a result, in the current study, participants who have 
low numeracy were hypothesized to be more susceptible to the framing effect than participants 
higher in numeracy. 
Method 
Design 
 A between-subjects design was used. The independent variables were the instruction 
manipulation (deliberative, experiential, or affective processing), short- vs. long-term 
information, frame (e.g., survival vs. mortality), and age. The dependent variable was the 
decision outcome (e.g., surgery or radiation). Objective numeracy was used as a control variable. 
Participants 
 Three hundred and forty-three participants (119 younger adults; 18-37; M = 27.24, SD = 
4.73, 118 middle-aged adults; 40-58; M = 47.08, SD = 4.87, and 108 older adults; 60-87; M = 
64.47; SD = 4.22) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011) during the course of 3 days. Amazon Mechanical Turk is a web-based interface 
that permits the recruitment of participants via Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs). Researchers 
post advertisements for their studies in the HITs and qualified participants can take the surveys 
for payment. Participants accrue money as they participate in HITs, allowing them to remove the 
funds as Amazon gift cards or later be paid to their bank account. In the current study, 
participants were paid $1.50 as compensation for their survey completion that took an average of 
31 minutes to complete. This amount of payment is typical of Amazon Mechanical Turk as the 
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program is set up so that participants accrue money as they participate in multiple studies. In the 
current study, participants were limited to those with an approval rate greater than 95%, greater 
than 500 approved HITs, and those who live in the United States. The study was not visible to 
participants who did not meet those requirements. Table 1 contains demographic information for 
the participants.  
Procedure 
 Participants read the consent form and indicated their consent before participating in the 
study. Participants were rerouted from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website to an external link 
via Qualtrics (Qualtrics Labs, Inc.) to complete the study. Before completing the framing items, 
participants completed the demographic questionnaire (Appendix B). They also completed the 
General Decision-Making Styles scale (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995; Appendix C), the 
Numeracy scale (Lipkus et al., 2001; Appendix D), and the Resistance to Framing measure 
(Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2007; Appendix E) before they completed the framing effect questions. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four instruction manipulation conditions: 
deliberative, experiential, affective, or control (see Appendix A). Participants in all conditions 
completed the same questionnaires. They first read instructions telling them to either answer the 
decision situation using "only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers," "based on 
their initial reactions and gut feelings," to make their decisions based on "only their previous 
experiences and experiences of others that they are familiar with," or to "make their decisions as 
they normally would" depending if they have been randomly assigned to the deliberative, 
affective, experiential, or control condition, respectively. They then read two vignettes detailing 
a medical situation (i.e., lung cancer or the flu) in which a decision needed to be made regarding 
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their medical treatment (Appendix A). They were presented with each vignette once, framed as 
survival or mortality.  
 After completing each framing effect vignette (cancer and flu), they were asked to what 
extent they used each type of processing in their decision making (manipulation check). They 
were then asked to indicate whether the short- or long-term information was most important to 
their decisions and finished the study by completing the Consideration of Future Consequences 
scale (CFC; Strathman et al., 1994; Appendix F) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005; Appendix G). When participants completed all of the measures, they were 
debriefed about the purpose of the study. The participants were compensated via their Amazon 
Mechanical Turk account. 
Measures  
Demographics. The demographic questionnaire that was completed by each participant 
assessed gender, race, ethnicity, age, sex, marital status, highest education attained, current or 
previous major, type of job of longest employment, current job, income, and questions regarding 
difficulty paying bills (Appendix B). Participants were also asked to rate their experience with 
economic principles and their personal and vicarious experience with medical decision making, 
lung cancer, and the flu on a scale from 1 (no experience) to 5 (much experience). Participants 
also indicated their perceived decision-making ability in light of their own aging as better, the 
same, or not as good (Appendix B).  
General Decision-Making Style. Decision-making style was measured using the 
General Decision Making Style scale (GDMS; Scott & Bruce, 1995; Appendix C). The GDMS is 
comprised of 25 items that are broken into 5 subscales: rational, intuitive, dependent, avoidant, 
and spontaneous. Participants responded to each item on a 5 point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
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disagree; 5 = strongly agree). A total score for each subscale was computed by averaging across 
items from each of the subscales. An example rational item is the following: “I double-check my 
information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making decisions.” Reliability for the 
five subscales is as follows (Loo, 2000): rational (α = .81), intuitive (α = .79), dependent (α = 
.62), avoidant (α = .79), and spontaneous (α = .76). The ranges, means, and standard deviations 
for the subscales are as follows: rational (2.00-5.00; M = 3.20, SD = .43), intuitive (1.80-5.00; M 
= 3.16, SD = .49), dependent (1.40-5.00; M = 3.08, SD = .59), avoidant (1.00-4.40; M = 2.53, SD 
= .63), and spontaneous (1.75-4.20; M = 2.90, SD = .42).  
Numeracy Scale. Numeracy was measured by using the Numeracy scale (Appendix D) 
developed by Lipkus et al. (2001). The Numeracy scale is comprised of 11 items that evaluate 
how well participants can understand and use probabilities, percentages, and simple 
mathematical procedures. An example item is the following: 
“Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? Please 
circle only one choice that best represents your answer.  
A) 1 in 100  
B) 1 in 1,000   
C) 1 in 10” 
Two out of 11 items are multiple choice items while the other nine are open-ended questions. 
Participants’ numeracy scores are determined by adding the number of correct items. Scores 
ranged from 0-11.00 (M = 8.62, SD = 2.09). 
Resistance to framing. Each participant’s resistance to the framing effect was measured 
using the attribute framing subscale of the Resistance to Framing measure (Bruine de Bruin et 
al., 2007; Appendix E). Fourteen items measured attribute framing. Items used to measure 
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attribute framing are framed in positive and negative manners (seven items of each). Participants 
completed this measure prior to undergoing the instruction manipulation. The following is an 
example of an attribute item framed positively:  
“Imagine that a new technique has been developed to treat a particular kind of cancer.  
This technique has a 50% chance of success, and is available at the local hospital. 
A member of your immediate family is a patient at the local hospital with this kind of 
cancer.  Would you encourage him or her to undergo treatment using this technique?” 
Participants responded on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = definitely no; 6 = definitely yes). Scores for 
were determined by calculating the difference between the analogous items and then averaging 
across the items. The Cronbach’s alpha is .80. Scores ranged from -1.67-3.43 (M = .36, SD = 
.74).           
Instruction manipulation condition. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
instruction manipulation groups: deliberative, experiential, affective, or a control condition (see 
Appendix A). Pilot testing was conducted to determine an effective instruction manipulation for 
each condition. Upon examination of the pilot data, the framing effect was most prevalent using 
the instruction manipulations described below. These instruction manipulations also resulted in 
significant differences from one another in a manipulation check (see below) verifying the 
information that participants were paying attention to while making their decisions in the pilot 
study.  The instruction manipulations for this study have been modified from the manipulation 
used by Thomas and Millar (2012). The instructions for each condition were as follows (also 
found in Appendix A): 
[Deliberative condition]: "Please read the following scenarios. Use only logic and 
reasoning based on the facts and numbers to make your decision on the following page." 
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Participants were reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations with the 
following instructions: "Please use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers 
presented in the scenarios to make your decision."  
 [Affective condition]: "Please read the following scenarios. Use only your initial 
reactions and gut feelings to make your decision on the following page." Participants were 
reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations with the following 
instructions: "Please use only your initial reactions and gut feelings to make your decision." 
 [Experiential condition]: "Please read the following scenarios. Use only your previous 
experiences and experiences of others that you are familiar with to make your decision on the 
following page." They were reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations 
with the following instructions: "Please use only your previous experiences and those of others 
to make your decision." 
 [Control condition]: "Please read the following scenarios and make your decision as you 
normally would." They were reminded of the instructions before reading the decision situations 
with the following instructions: "Please make your decision as you normally would." 
 Framing effect. The framing effect was measured by presenting participants with one 
pair of medical vignettes adapted from McNeil et al. (1982) and a pair of medical vignettes 
created for this study based on McNeil et al. (1982) (see Appendix A). The vignettes were edited 
by eliminating the immediate information from the decision-making vignettes to remove the 
confound between the immediate- and short-term information. The McNeil et al. (1982) 
vignettes require participants to consider treatment for cancer and the other pair required 
participants to determine how they would like to receive a vaccination for the flu (modeled after 
McNeil et al.’s (1982) vignettes but designed for this study; Appendix E). The cancer vignettes 
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are framed in terms of either survival or mortality. The flu vignettes are framed in terms of either 
getting the flu or not getting the flu. Before reading and answering the vignettes, participants 
read a short description of each option, including symptoms of each option and recovery time 
(see Appendix A). The following is an example of two of the framing decision situations for the 
cancer scenario, framed in terms of survival: 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, 77 patients live for more than 1 year, and 23 
patients live for more than 5 years. 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 68 patients live for more than 1 year, and 32 patients live 
for more than 5 years. 
Participants were then asked to decide rather they would choose radiation or surgery. The cancer 
and flu decision situations were analyzed individually as separate decision choices. In the 
analyses, frame was used as a predictor for decision outcome. Specifically, frame (e.g., survival 
vs. mortality) as a significant predictor of decision outcome (e.g., surgery vs. radiation) indicated 
that the framing effect occurred. That is, different decisions were made based on the frame of the 
decision situation. 
 Manipulation check. As a manipulation check for the instruction manipulation, 
participants indicated to what extent they used logic and reasoning based on the facts and 
numbers, their experiences and those of others, and their initial reactions and gut feelings (see 
Appendix H). Participants answered each question regardless to which condition they were 
randomly assigned. The questions were presented after participants answered each framing 
vignette to gauge the type of information that they used to make their decision.  
 Short- vs. long-term information. To assess whether the short- or long-term 
information was most salient in the participants’ decision making, they were asked to rate how 
AGE DIFFERENCES IN THE FRAMING EFFECT 33 
 
 
important the short- and long-term information was to their decision (see Appendix H). The 
following is an example asking the participants to rate the short-term information: “How 
important was the short-term information (i.e., the number of patients living or who had died one 
year after receiving the treatment) to you in your decision making?”  
Consideration of Future Consequences. Participants completed the Consideration of 
Future Consequences (CFC) scale (Strathman et al., 1994; Appendix F) to measure individual 
differences in people’s consideration of distant vs. immediate consequences of potential 
behaviors. The scale is comprised of 12 items to which the participants responded on a scale of 1 
(extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic). To score the CFC scale, items 3, 4, 
5, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were reversed scored. All of the items were then summed, with higher scores 
indicating that a participant has a greater consideration of future consequences. The Cronbach’s 
alpha was .88 and scores ranged from 1.63-5.00 (M = 3.48, SD = .66) 
Cognitive Reflection Test. The Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) is comprised 
of three hypothetical vignettes that require the participants to give a solution to a simple 
mathematical question (e.g., asking how much an item costs given the price of another item; 
Appendix G). The three vignettes are simple enough that participants easily understand them 
when they are explained, but often yield incorrect decisions, likely as a result of participants 
relying on their intuition (Frederick, 2005). Participants’ answers are classified as either 
deliberative or intuitive. Intuitive answers are frequently given, but yield incorrect answers. An 
intuitive answer was given a score of 0. A deliberative answer is a correct decision and was 
given a score of 1. Total scores were calculated by summing across the 3 vignettes for a range of 
0-3.00 (M = 1.53, SD = 1.24).  
Results 




 See Table 2 for steps taken to ensure data quality such as removal of data based on trap 
questions, inconsistently reported birth years and Amazon Mechanical Turk IDs. Table 2 also 
contains information pertaining to outliers and multicollinearity. Within the survey were three 
"trap" questions designed to assess the participants' level of attention throughout the survey. In 
addition, participants were asked to verify their birth year and Mechanical Turk ID on two 
separate occasions, once in the beginning of the survey and once near the end of the survey prior 
to being given their survey code to enter into the Mechanical Turk system. 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Pearson correlations were also conducted between the measures (see Table 3). Close 
inspection reveals that CFC and the importance of long-term information were positively 
correlated. Age and perceived decision-making ability were also positively correlated. An 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) or multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted 
for each measure (i.e., GDMS, Resistance to Framing, CRT, CFC, and numeracy) for each 
condition and age group. 
Manipulation check. A one-way ANOVA was performed to assess differences in the 
three instruction manipulations:  the extent to which participants used their logic and reasoning 
based on the facts and numbers, their experiences and those of others, and their initial reactions 
and gut feelings to make their decisions. Participants were asked to respond to three questions 
post-framing vignettes (see description in Measures above).  
 Deliberative. An ANOVA was used to examine the difference in extent that participants 
used the deliberative information (i.e., their logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers) 
to answer the framing vignettes. There was a significant difference in the extent to which 
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participants indicated that they used the deliberative information by condition, F(1,340) = 17.74, 
p < .001, η
2 
= .14. That is, participants in the deliberative condition (M = 4.40, SD = .63) 
indicated that they used the facts and figures significantly more than participants in the 
experiential (M = 3.65, SD = 1.03), affective (M = 3.42, SD = 1.03), and control (M = 3.80, SD = 
.96) conditions. Participants in the experiential condition did not differ in the extent to which 
they used the deliberative information from participants in the control and affective conditions. 
However, participants in the control condition indicated that they used the facts and figures 
significantly more than participants in the affective condition.  
 Experience. There was a significant difference in the extent to which participants 
indicated that they used the experiential information (i.e., their previous experiences or those of 
others that they are familiar with) to answer the framing vignettes in the experiential condition, 
F(1,340) = 17.36, p < .001, η
2 
= .13. Participants in the experiential condition (M = 3.62, SD = 
1.11) indicated that they used their previous experiences significantly more than participants in 
the deliberative (M = 2.40, SD = 1.23), affective (M = 2.77, SD = 1.28), and control (M = 2.66, 
SD = 1.13) conditions. No differences existed between participants in the deliberative and 
affective conditions, the deliberative and control conditions, and the affective and control 
conditions. 
 Affect. There was a significant difference in the extent to which participants indicated 
that they used the affective information (i.e., their initial reactions and gut feelings) to answer the 
framing vignettes in the affective condition, F(1,340) = 17.25, p < .001, η
2 
= .13. Participants in 
the affective condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.06) used their gut feelings and intuition significantly 
more than participants in the deliberative (M = 2.56, SD = 1.30), experiential (M = 3.23, SD = 
1.08), and control (M = 2.95, SD = 1.06) conditions. Participants in the experiential condition 
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also used their gut feelings and intuition more than participants in the deliberative condition. No 
other significant differences were noted.  
General Decision-Making Scale. An age difference was present for the avoidant 
subscale (see Table 4). Specifically, younger adults (M = 2.65, SD = .61) were more avoidant 
than middle-aged adults (M = 2.41, SD = .59). There was no difference between younger and 
older adults (M = 2.54, SD = .66) and older and middle-aged adults.  There were no other 
significant differences in age, condition, or an interaction between age and condition (see Table 
4). 
Resistance to Framing. There was no age difference in resistance to framing, F(1,331) = 
.24 p = .78, η
2 
= .001. Younger, (M = .34, SD = .66), middle-aged (M = .39, SD = .77), and older 
adults (M = .33, SD = .76) did not differ. There was also no difference in instruction 
manipulation condition, F(1,331) = .79 p = .50, η
2 
= .007. Resistance to framing did not differ 
depending on the deliberative (M = .34, SD = .78), experiential (M = .46, SD = .68), affective (M 
= .30, SD = .75), and control (M = .31, SD = .72) condition. The interaction between age and 
instruction manipulation condition was also not significant. 
Cognitive Reflection Test. There was no age difference in cognitive reflection, F(1,331) 
= 1.38, p = .25, η
2 
= .01. Specifically, younger (M = 1.68, SD = 1.21), middle-aged (M = 1.48, 
SD = 1.30), and older adults (M = 1.43, SD = 1.20) did not differ. There was also no difference in 
instruction manipulation condition in cognitive reflection, F(1,331) = .96, p = .41, η
2 
= .001. 
Cognitive reflection did not differ depending on the deliberative (M = 1.43, SD = 1.20), 
experiential (M = 1.53, SD = 1.27), affective (M = 1.47, SD = 1.22), and control (M = 1.71, SD = 
1.26) condition. The interaction between age and instruction manipulation condition was also not 
significant, F(1,331) = 1.39, p = .22, η
2 
= .03. 
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Consideration of Future Consequences. There was no age difference in consideration 
of future consequences, F(1,331) = .98, p = .38, η
2 
= .006. Younger (M = 3.50, SD = .69), 
middle-aged (M = 3.53, SD = .63), and older adults (M = 3.41, SD = .62) did not differ. There 
was also no difference in instruction manipulation condition in consideration of future 
consequences, F(1,331) = .42, p = .74, η
2 
= .004. Consideration of future consequences did not 
differ depending on the deliberative (M = 3.44, SD = .64), experiential (M = 3.54, SD = .64), 
affective (M = 3.51, SD = .68), and control (M = 3.45, SD = .66) condition. The interaction 




Numeracy. There was no age difference in numeracy, F(1,331) = 1.06, p = .35, η
2 
= .006. 
Younger (M = 8.52, SD = 2.16), middle-aged (M = 8.53, SD = 2.08), and older adults (M = 8.88, 
SD = 1.95) did not differ. There was also no difference in instruction manipulation condition in 
numeracy, F(1,331) = .2.17, p = .09, η
2 
= .02. Numeracy did not differ depending on the 
deliberative (M = 8.71, SD = 2.02), experiential (M = 8.66, SD = 1.81), affective (M = 8.17, SD = 
2.64), and control (M = 8.99, SD = 1.63) condition. The interaction between age and instruction 




 In the current study, frame (e.g., survival vs. mortality) was used as a predictor for the 
decision outcome (e.g., surgery or radiation).  That is, participants are more likely to choose 
surgery (exhibit risk aversion) in the survival frame and radiation in the mortality frame (exhibit 
risk seeking). Table 5 gives the frequencies and percentages for each decision choice per vignette 
for each instruction condition by frame. These frequencies demonstrate that participants were 
more likely to indicate that they would choose surgery in the survival frame and radiation in the 
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mortality frame for the lung cancer vignette. The only exception is in the affective instruction 
condition, in which participants indicated for both the survival and morality frame that they 
would be more likely to choose radiation, 53.7% and 69.8% respectively. For the flu vignette, 
overall participants indicated that they would choose the vaccination shot over the nasal spray 
despite the frame and instruction condition. Table 6 gives the frequencies and percentages for 
each decision choice per vignette for each instruction condition, frame, and age difference. 
Research Question 1 
Hypotheses 1a-1d. 
[1a] Participants in the deliberative condition were hypothesized to be more likely to 
demonstrate the framing effect than participants in the affective or experiential 
conditions. 
[1b] Younger adults in the deliberative and affective conditions were hypothesized to 
demonstrate the framing effect more frequently than younger adults in the experiential 
condition. 
[1c] Older adults in the deliberative condition were hypothesized to be more likely to 
demonstrate the framing effect than older adults in the experiential and affective 
conditions. 
[1d] Older adults in the affective system were hypothesized to demonstrate the framing 
effect less frequently than younger adults in the affective condition. 
Overall Framing Effect 
 Lung cancer. A 2 (frame: survival vs. mortality) x 2 (surgery vs. radiation) chi-square 
was used to examine the framing effect. The chi-square value was significant, χ
2
(1, N = 343) = 
16.40, p < .001, phi = .22. In the mortality frame, 107 participants (62.2%) chose radiation and 
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65 participants (37.8%) chose surgery. In the survival frame, 68 participants (39.8%) chose 
radiation and 103 participants (60.2%) chose surgery.  
 Flu. A 2 (frame: no flu vs. get flu) x 2 (vaccination shot vs. nasal spray) chi-square was 
used to examine the framing effect. The chi-square value was not significant, χ
2
(1, N = 344) = 
2.60, p = .085, phi = .10. In the negative (get flu) frame, 115 participants (66.1%) chose the 
vaccination shot and 59 participants (33.9%) chose the nasal spray. In the positive (no flu) frame, 
97 participants (57.1%) chose the vaccination shot and 73 participants (42.9%) chose the nasal 
spray. 
Age by Instruction Condition by Frame Interaction 
 Logistic regression models for each predictor individually can be found in Appendix I. 
Reported below are the logistic regression models with the all of the predictors in the model (i.e., 
age, instruction condition, and frame) and models containing numeracy as a control variable.   
 Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed to assess the impact of frame (survival 
or mortality), age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and instruction condition 
(deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors and decision choice (surgery or 
radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the outcome. The full model was not significant, χ
2
(23, N 
= 342) = 34.99, p = .052 (Cox and Snell R Square, 9.7%; Nagelkerke R Square, 13%), indicating 
that the model did not significantly distinguish between participants who indicated they would 
choose surgery and participants who indicated they would choose radiation. The model correctly 
classified 64.3% of cases. Frame, instruction condition, age, and the interactions were not 
significant predictors of decision (see Table 7).  
 Lung cancer: Numeracy as a covariate. A logistic regression was performed to assess 
the impact of frame (survival or mortality), age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and 
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instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors, numeracy 
as a covariate, and decision choice (surgery or radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the 
outcome. Numeracy was entered at step 1 and frame, age, and instruction condition were entered 
at step 2. The model at step 1 was not significant, χ
2
(1, N = 342) = .024, p = .88. The model at 
step 2 was approaching significance, χ
2
(23, N = 342) = 34.97, p = .052 (Cox and Snell R Square, 
9.7%; Nagelkerke R Square, 13%). The model correctly classified 64.3% of cases. None of the 
predictors nor the interactions between predictors were significant (see Table 8).  
 Flu. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the flu or not get the flu), age 
(younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, 
affective, and control) as predictors and decision choice (vaccination shot or nasal spray) for flu 
prevention as the outcome. The full model was not significant, χ
2
(23, N = 343) = 25.00, p = .35 
(Cox and Snell R Square, 7.0%; Nagelkerke R Square, 9.5%).  The model correctly classified 
64.4% of cases. There was a significant age by condition by frame interaction for older adults in 
the control condition and positive flu frame (odds ratio .023). This indicates that older adults in 
the control condition and positive flu frame were less than 1 times more likely to choose nasal 
spray over the vaccination shot than participants in the deliberative instruction condition (see 
Table 9). In addition, there was a significant age by condition interaction for older adults in the 
affective condition (odds ratio 12.96), indicating that these participants were over 12 times as 
likely to choose the nasal spray over the vaccination shot (see Table 9). 
 Flu: Numeracy as a covariate. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the 
flu or not get the flu), age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults), and instruction condition 
(deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors, numeracy as a covariate, and 
decision choice (vaccination shot or nasal spray) for flu prevention as the outcome. Numeracy 
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was entered at step 1 and frame, age, and instruction condition were entered at step 2. The model 
at step 1 was not significant, χ
2
(1, N = 343) = .10, p = .75. The model at step 2 was not 
significant, χ
2
(23, N = 344) = 24.90, p = .36 (Cox and Snell R Square, 7.0%; Nagelkerke R 
Square, 9.5%). The model correctly classified 64.7% of cases. None of the predictors were 
significant (see Table 10). However, an age by condition interaction was present. Older adults in 
the control condition (odds ratio 12.99) were over 12 times as likely to choose the nasal spray 
over the vaccination shot (see Table 10). 
Summary for Hypotheses 1a-1d 
 In summary, the framing effect was present in the lung cancer scenario overall, with 
participants in the survival condition indicating that they would choose surgery over radiation. 
The framing effect was not present in the flu scenario. There were no age-related or instruction 
condition differences in the framing effect for the lung cancer and flu scenarios. However, an age 
by instruction condition interaction was present in the flu scenario (with and without numeracy 
as a covariate).  
Research Question 2 
 Hypothesis 2a. Participants’ decisions were hypothesized to be influenced more by the 
short-term information in the mortality (or getting the flu) frame and by the long-term 
information in the survival (or not getting the flu) frame when instructed to use their deliberative 
system.  
 Lung cancer. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 2 (frame: survival vs. 
mortality) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of short- 
and long-term information in the survival vs. mortality frames of participants in the deliberative 
condition. Results revealed a significant difference in frame for the short-term information, 
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F(1,340) = 5.79, p = .02, η
2 
= .02. Participants in the mortality frame indicated that the short-term 
information (M = 3.86, SD = 1.06) influenced their decision more than participants in the 
survival frame (M = 3.57, SD = 1.14). No difference in frame was identified for the long-term 
information, F(1,340) = 3.72, p = .05, η
2 
= .01.  
 Flu. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 2 (frame: no flu vs. got flu) 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of short- and long-
term information in the no flu vs. got flu frames of participants in the deliberative condition. 
There was no difference in short-term information in the no flu and got flu frames, F(1,341) = 
.14, p = .71, η
2 
= .00. The influence of the short-term information did not differ in the got flu 
frame (M = 3.59, SD = 1.23) and the no flu frame (M = 3.54, SD = 1.14). 
 No difference was found in the long-term information, F(1,341) = .72, p = .40, η
2 
= .002. 
The importance of the long-term information did not differ in the got flu (M = 3.68, SD = 1.15) 
and no flu frame (M = 3.78, SD = 1.04).  
Summary for Hypothesis 2a 
 The short-term information was more important to participants’ decisions in the mortality 
frame than the survival frame in the deliberative condition. There was no difference in 
importance of the long-term information in the survival and mortality frames. In the flu scenario, 
there was no difference in the importance of short- or long-term information in either the no flu 
or got flu frames.  
 Hypothesis 2b. The long-term information in the survival (or not getting the flu) frame 
was hypothesized to influence older adults’ decisions more than younger and middle-aged 
adults.   
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 Lung cancer. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group: 
younger, middle-aged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine 
the effect of short- and long-term information in the survival frame. Results revealed no 
difference in age group for short-term information, F(1,167) = 1.90, p = .15, η
2 
= .02. The 
importance of short-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.37, SD = 1.12), 
middle-aged (M = 3.64, SD = 1.21), and older adults (M = 3.78, SD = 1.03). Similarly, no 
difference was identified for long-term information F(1,167) = .24, p = .79, η
2 
= .003. The 
importance of the long-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.97, SD = 1.01), 
middle-aged (M = 4.03, SD = 1.07), and older adults (M = 4.10, SD = 1.01). 
 Flu. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group: younger, middle-
aged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of 
short- and long-term information in the no flu frame. Results revealed no difference in age group 
for short-term information, F(1,167) = .12, p = .88, η
2 
= .001. The importance of the short-term 
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.60, SD = 1.12), middle-aged (M = 3.49, SD = 
1.19), and older adults (M = 3.54, SD = 1.11). Results revealed no difference in age group for 
long-term information, F(1,167) = .30, p = .74, η
2 
= .004. The importance of long-term 
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.82, SD = .97), middle-aged (M = 3.81, SD = 
1.12), and older adults (M = 3.69, SD = 1.04). 
Summary for Hypothesis 2b 
 There was no main effect of age or instruction condition on the importance of short- and 
long-term information in the survival (no flu) frame. Furthermore, there was no interaction 
between age and instruction condition in the importance of the short- and long-term information 
in the survival (no flu) frame.  
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Hypothesis 2c.  The short-term information in the mortality (or getting the flu) frame 
was hypothesized to influence older adults' decisions more than younger and middle-aged adults. 
Lung cancer. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group: 
younger, middle-aged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine 
the effect of short- and long-term information in the mortality frame. Results revealed no 
difference in age group for short-term information, F(1,168) = .59, p = .55, η
2 
= .01. The 
importance of short-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.75, SD = 1.18), 
middle-aged (M = 3.97, SD = .91), and older adults (M = 3.86, SD = 1.10). Similarly, no 
difference was identified for long-term information F(1,167) = .99, p = .37, η
2 
= .01. The 
importance of long-term information did not differ among younger (M = 3.86, SD = 1.12), 
middle-aged (M = 3.92, SD = 1.10), and older adults (M = 3.62, SD = 1.26). 
Flu. A 2 (information: short- vs. long-term information) x 3 (age group: younger, middle-
aged, older) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to examine the effect of 
short- and long-term information in the got flu frame. Results revealed no difference in age 
group for short-term information, F(1,169) = .38, p = .68, η
2 
= .01. The importance of short-term 
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.48, SD = 1.11), middle-aged (M = 3.64, SD = 
1.27), and older adults (M = 3.65, SD = 1.36). Results revealed no difference in age group for 
long-term information, F(1,169) = .77, p = .47, η
2 
= .01. The importance of long-term 
information did not differ among younger (M = 3.77, SD = 1.09), middle-aged (M = 3.53, SD = 
1.17), and older adults (M = 3.73, SD = 1.21). 
Summary for Hypothesis 2c 
 There was no main effect of age or instruction manipulation on the importance of short- 
and long-term information in the mortality (got flu) frame. In addition, there was no interaction 
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between age and instruction condition in the importance of the short- and long-term information 
in the mortality (got flu) frame. 
Research Question 3 
Hypothesis 3. Participants who have low numeracy were hypothesized to be more 
susceptible to the framing effect than participants higher in numeracy. 
Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed to assess the contribution of numeracy 
and frame on the likelihood that participants would indicate that they would choose surgery or 
radiation for lung cancer. The full model was significant, χ
2
 (3, N = 343) = 17.53, p = .001 (Cox 
and Snell R Square, 5.0%; Nagelkerke R Square, 6.6%), indicating that the model significantly 
distinguished between participants who indicated they would choose surgery and participants 
who indicated they would choose radiation. The model correctly classified 61.2% of cases. 
However, neither frame nor numeracy (or the interaction) significantly contributed to the model 
(see Table 11).  
Flu. A logistic regression was performed to assess the contribution of numeracy and 
frame on the likelihood that participants would indicate that they would choose the vaccinator 
the nasal spray for the flu. The full model was not significant, χ
2
 (3, N = 343) = 3.76, p = .29 
(Cox and Snell R Square, 1.1%; Nagelkerke R Square, 1.5%), indicating that the model did not 
distinguished between participants who indicated they would choose the vaccination shot and 
participants who indicated they would choose the nasal spray. The model correctly classified 
61.6% of cases. However, neither frame nor numeracy (or the interaction) significantly 
contributed to the model (see Table 12). 
Summary for Hypothesis 3 
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 The full model for the lung cancer and flu scenarios was significant; however, neither 
frame nor numeracy was a significant predictor and there was no interaction between frame and 
numeracy.  
Discussion 
 Results revealed that decisions in the lung cancer scenario differed depending on frame; 
specifically, participants were more likely to choose radiation in the mortality frame and surgery 
in the survival frame. However, manipulating instructions according to deliberative, experiential, 
or affective processing did not affect demonstration of the framing effect. Moreover, age-related 
differences in the framing effect were not identified. On the other hand, interactions were 
identified for the flu scenario: older adults in the affective condition were more likely to indicate 
that they would choose the nasal spray than the vaccination shot in the positive flu frame. Older 
adults were also more likely to choose nasal spray over the vaccination shot when in the control 
condition and positive flu frame than those in the deliberative condition. As hypothesized, short-
term information was more salient to participants' decision in the mortality frame (lung cancer); 
contrarily, there was no difference in the importance of long-term information (lung cancer or 
flu).  
Instruction Manipulation  
 Contrary to Thomas and Millar (2012), no differences were identified in demonstration of 
the framing effect by processing group (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control). Despite 
similarities in the instruction manipulation, participants in the current study responded to medical 
decision-making vignettes, whereas Thomas and Millar (2012) had participants respond to 
gambling scenarios. The medical decisions were much more complex and the outcomes more 
serious (life vs. death or getting the flu vs. no flu) than in the gambling scenarios. As a result, it 
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is possible that all participants, despite their instruction condition, thought more critically about 
their decisions, resulting in similar vulnerability to the framing effect.  
 Although no differences were found as a result of the instruction manipulation, a 
manipulation check revealed that the participants were correctly using the information they were 
told to use to make their decisions. Specifically, in the deliberative condition, participants 
indicated that they paid the most attention to the facts and figures; in the experiential condition 
participants indicated that they used their previous experiences and those of others; and in the 
affect condition, participants indicated that they used their gut feelings and intuition. However, 
the analyses also revealed that participants in the control condition indicated that they used the 
facts and figures more than participants in the affect condition and participants in the experiential 
condition indicated that they used their gut feelings and intuition more than participants in the 
deliberative condition. These results indicate that some overlap may have occurred in the extent 
to which participants used the type of information they were told to use. This speaks to the 
degree of overlap that is described by Strough et al. (2011) in the three processes. Specifically, 
participants likely experienced competing processes when making their decision even after being 
instructed to use particular elements of the decision-making scenario.  
 In addition, it could be that in situations requiring high mental cognitive function, people 
are less sensitive to the framing effect, consistent with Thomas and Millar (2012). Thomas and 
Millar (2012) found that the framing effect was eliminated when participants were primed to use 
more analytical thinking by having them complete probability calculations in between blocks of 
decision situations. Thus, when decisions require working memory and higher-level thinking, 
people may be more prone to use their deliberative system or will think through their decisions 
rather than using automatic processing or heuristics. In the current study, the decision-making 
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vignettes were cognitively intense, requiring participants to think through various details about 
the situations (see Appendix A).  
 Another possibility is that priming heuristics through the experiential and affective 
conditions may also increase vulnerability (Cassotti et al., 2012). People have a tendency to 
respond more strongly to losses than gains, also known as loss aversion or value function 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People could have also been 
overweighting low probabilities and underweighting larger probabilities, a probability weighting 
function (Soman, 2004). For example, people could have underweighted the probability of dying 
after 5 years and overweighted the probability of dying after 1 year.  
 It is also possible that the type of processing influences people's decisions, but other 
information related to the decision situation has a greater influence. For example, short-term 
information was a significant predictor of decision in the mortality frame within the deliberative 
condition. People could be using this information to make their decision, overriding their drive to 
use a particular type of processing. Another possibility derived from the results regarding the 
short-term information is that people could have been using their gist of the situation to make 
their decision. That is, as Reyna (2004) described, gist representations are easy to access and are 
comprised of an overall picture of the situation. However, the details are "fuzzy," and people 
have a tendency to rely on their broad understanding of the situation to guide the way. In terms 
of mortality, perhaps the short-term information is what is being used to create the gist (e.g., the 
length of time that people will have before they die after treatment), creating a reliance on the 
short-term information to make their decisions with the end result of making different decisions 
depending on the frame.   
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 Finally, the prior experience that people have regarding hypothetical vignettes may lead 
to differences in demonstration rates of the framing effect regardless of which decision-making 
process is primed using instructions. Overall, 7.2% of participants indicated that they had a lot or 
much experience with lung cancer and 31.9% of participants indicated that they had a lot or 
much experience with the flu. However, 61.6% of participants indicated that they had a lot or 
much experience with making medical decisions for themselves or others in the past 5 years. A 
possibility is that participants did not have enough experience with making the types of decisions 
that were asked of them to elicit a true response. A majority of the participants had a lot of 
experience with making medical decisions in the past year, but did not have experience with the 
flu or lung cancer. As a result, participants could have defaulted to thinking thoroughly about the 
medical situations in an attempt to understand all of the information that was being given to them 
regarding the decision they needed to make. In addition, the lack of significance regarding the flu 
vignette could be a result of the unfamiliarity with a nasal spray as a vaccination method for the 
flu. Participants could have chosen the treatment that they are the most knowledgeable about. 
Contrarily, very few participants had experience with lung cancer, but radiation and surgery are 
both commonly understood as treatments for lunch cancer.  
Age Differences 
 No age differences were found in demonstration of the framing effect. Despite 
differences being identified in previous literature (Kim et al., 2005; McNeil et al., 1982; Mikels 
& Reed, 2009; Wang et al., 2001), in the current study, only frame was a significant predictor of 
decision outcome. This finding is consistent with previous research that has found little to no 
age-related differences in demonstration of the framing effect (e.g., Mayhorn et al., 2002; 
Rönnlund et al., 2005).  
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 Although it was hypothesized that age differences would be present, perhaps frame is a 
more important predictor than age when making decisions. As a result, it may be more prudent 
for doctors or other influential personnel to frame decisions in a particular manner as to prevent 
the framing effect. For example, by presenting the outcomes in terms of both survival and 
mortality people will have all of the information and may be able to make better decisions. 
 A potential explanation for these findings is that reading scenarios dealing with survival 
vs. mortality primed participants to contemplate the end of their life, therefore, limiting their 
time perspective. Previous research has identified a limited time perspective as being more 
consistent with older adults (Carstensen, 2006). According to socioemotional selectivity theory, 
people seek to optimize their current experiences when their time perspective is limited 
(Cartensen, 2006; Carstensen & Charles, 1998). Because time is viewed as limited, people seek 
to capitalize on their current experiences and minimize their losses. In the current study, the lung 
cancer scenario was a life or death scenario, possibly limiting people's time perspective, resulting 
in decisions that are similar to older adults’ decisions. In the mortality frame, they were more 
likely to pay attention to the short-term. Because the short-term information was framed to 
indicate the number of people who would die within 6 months, people may have been seeking to 
use that information to maximize their current experience. That is, their limited time perspective 
led them to pay close attention to the short-term information. In previous research, manipulating 
younger adults' time perspectives to induce a limited time perspective leads them to behave like 
older adults in examinations of a decision making bias called the sunk-cost fallacy (Strough, 
Schlosnagle, Karns, Lemaster, & Pichayayothin, 2013).  
Limitations 
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 The results presented here should be considered in light of some limitations. Despite the 
quick, efficient data collection Amazon Mechanical Turk allows, as with any study, the quality 
of the data may come into question. Trap questions were included to eliminate participants who 
answered without reading the questions or were not paying enough attention, but participants on 
Mechanical Turk are likely used to these types of questions, and may be able to easily identify 
them. Furthermore, the instruction manipulation may work in a lab setting where outside factors, 
such as background noise, attention to other tasks, etc., are being controlled. Conducting an 
online study does not allow for control of these noise variables. However, laboratory settings do 
not allow for broad generalizability or a national sample in most cases. 
In addition, because the data was collected online, the sample of older adults was limited 
to those ranging in age from 60 to 87 with the average age being 64.47. This range is younger 
than the average older adult age reported in a meta-analysis by Mata et al. (2011) (M = 69). 
Consequently, the results of the current study may be a factor of cohort differences rather than 
age differences.  The design of this study was also a between-subjects design. Although a 
between-subjects design eliminates the possibility of participants recognizing a consistency issue 
(Stanovich & West, 2008), it does not allow for comparisons within participants. Another 
limitation of the current study is the unconfirmed conceptual model. No previous research has 
attempted to investigate decision-making from a three-dimensional framework so this study 
serves as a preliminary investigation.  
Finally, the external validity of the current study may be limited by the methodology. 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves in a medical situation and were told what type of 
information to pay attention to. Previous research (Siminoff & Fetting, 1989) has found that 
people who are making actual medical decisions are less susceptible to the framing effect than 
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people who are asked to imagine themselves in a decision situation. This is likely because people 
are more thorough with decisions that may directly affect them in the near and distant future. 
Future research should examine this three-dimensional decision-making framework among 
people who are making actual medical decisions. 
Strengths 
 The current study is the first to expand the dual-process theory to a three-dimensional 
conceptual decision-making framework. Previous research (Keren, 2013; Keren & Schul, 2009; 
Kruglanski, 2013; Osman, 2013; Strough et al., 2011; Thompson, 2013) has demonstrated that 
two processing systems may not be sufficient for explaining decision making, lending to a debate 
as to whether two processes exist. Debates have raged on regarding the definitions of the two 
processes, the terminology used to name the processes, and the characteristics that make up each 
process. Although the results did not indicate a vulnerability to the framing effect depending on 
the instruction condition, future research could examine other manipulations and decision 
situations.  
 Moreover, the current study focused on medical decisions, decisions that are often life-
changing and threatening to people’s well-being, physically and mentally. Some past research 
has used medical decisions (e.g., Kim et al., 2005; McNeil et al., 1982), but other research has 
used gain vs. loss scenarios (e.g., Thomas & Millar, 2012) and computer-based tasks (Weller et 
al., 2011). 
In addition, previous research has found mixed results regarding age-related differences 
in the framing effect. The current study found further support for no age-related differences in 
susceptibility to the framing effect, similar to Rönnlund et al. (2005) and Mayhorn et al. (2002). 
In terms of real life decisions, this may be an indication that people do not become more 
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susceptible to the framing effect as they age, a good sign for older adults. However, ways of 
eliminating the framing effect (specifically in terms of mortality vs. survival) should be further 
investigated.  
Future Research 
 Future research should replicate the current study using a within-subjects design to 
further validate that the framing effect is not variable across ages and instruction manipulation 
conditions. Future research should also expand the older adult age range to gather data from 
oldest-old adults, a potential age range that may be more or less susceptible to the framing effect. 
An investigation of other types of medical decisions that pertain to a wide age range such as 
diabetes or asthma care could also be conducted. Both diseases have potentially harmful 
outcomes that can be limited by sufficiently treating them on a daily basis, adhering to doctors’ 
recommendations and treatment plans. Moreover, more research should be done to examine the 
types of instructions that are given to people when they are making their decisions. Although 
numeracy did not differ by age, overall, the average numeracy score was rather low. This 
indicates that people are generally bad at manipulating numbers, even for simple problems, 
which is an issue that should be addressed more fully in future research.  
Conclusions 
 The current study provides further support for no age differences in demonstration of the 
framing effect. Furthermore, numeracy may not be a factor that contributes to the framing effect. 
Future research should include a more thorough investigation of the framing effect among other 
medical decisions, specifically information regarding the short- and long-term outcomes of these 
decisions, and among real-life medical decisions. Furthermore, to broaden the scope regarding 
age differences in the framing effect, future research should examine cohort differences.  
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 Young Adults 
(N = 121) 
Middle-Aged Adults 
(N = 119) 
Older Adults 
(N =108) 
Age M = 27.22 (SD = 4.69) M = 47.02 (SD = 4.89) M = 64.50 (SD = 4.22) 
Gender F (n = 64; 52.9%) F (n = 76; 63.9%) F (n = 54; 50%) 
Marital status Never married 
(n = 63; 52.1%) 
Married 
(n = 58; 48.7%) 
Married 
(n = 61; 56.5%) 
Ethnicity Not Hispanic/Latino 
(n = 107; 88.4%) 
Not Hispanic/Latino 
(n = 113; 95%) 
Not Hispanic/Latino 
(n = 100; 92.6%) 
Race White or Caucasian 
(n = 95; 78.5%) 
White or Caucasian 
(n = 99; 83.2%) 
White or Caucasian 
(n = 97; 89.8%) 
Time zone Eastern 
(n = 60; 49.6%) 
Eastern 
(n = 52; 43.7%) 
Eastern 
(n = 55; 50.9%) 
Employment Full time 
(n =58; 47.9%) 
Full time 
(n = 62; 52.1%) 
Fully retired 
(n = 44; 40.7%) 
Education H.S. or GED 
(n = 49; 40.5%) 
H.S. or GED 
(n = 48; 40.3%) 
Bachelor's 
(n = 43; 39.8%) 
Income < $10k 
(n = 29; 24%) 
$10k-19k 
(n = 24; 20.2%) 
$20k-29k 




(n = 44; 36.4%) 
A little 
(n = 41; 34.5%) 
No difficulty 
(n = 40; 37%) 





Data cleaning, trap questions, outliers, and multicollinearity 
Note. N = 412 prior to cleaning data. 68 participants were removed, resulting in N = 343. 
 
Steps Situation Remedy 
1. Removal of data Most participants removed (n 
= 64) did not complete the 
first questionnaire. 
Removal of incomplete data. 
2. Mechanical Turk ID 
Matching 
MTurk ID's entered at the 
beginning and end of 
participation were compared. 
The only mismatched ID's 
occurred due to an extra space 
at the beginning of the ID. 
Space was removed. 
3. Birth years Participants' birthyear was 
collected at the beginning and 
end of survey.  
No mismatched birth years 
were detected.  
4. Scoring of trap 
questions 
Three trap questions were 
assessed for correctness. 
Participants who correctly 
answered less than 2 trap 
questions were removed (n = 
5) 
5. Outliers The SPSS function of Explore 
was used to assess the 
presence of outliers. 
No outliers were detected. 
6. Multicollinearity Multicollinearity of the 
predictors used in the logistic 
regression analyses was 
examined. 
No multicollinearity was 
detected. 








































Note. **p < 0.01 level *p <  0.05 level 
















Age  1 -.043 -.052 -.031 -.033 -.015 -.068 .009 -.087 .349
**
 .044 
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Note. *p < .05.  
 
 
GDMS df F p Partial Eta 
Squared 
Age Group 
Rational 2 2.830 .060 .017 
Intuition 2 .812 .445 .005 
Dependent 2 2.121 .122 .013 
Spontaneous 2 1.265 .284 .008 
Avoidant* 2 4.113 .017 .024 
Instruction 
Condition 
Rational 3 .453 .715 .004 
Intuition 3 1.148 .330 .010 
Dependent 3 .392 .759 .004 
Spontaneous 3 2.061 .105 .018 
Avoidant 3 .964 .410 .009 
Age Group x 
Instruction 
Condition 
Rational 6 1.523 .170 .027 
Intuition 6 1.009 .419 .018 
Dependent 6 1.165 .325 .021 
Spontaneous 6 .277 .948 .005 
Avoidant 6 .203 .976 .004 





Frequencies and percentages for each decision choice by frame and instruction condition 
Lung Cancer 
 Survival Mortality 
 Surgery Radiation Surgery Radiation 
Deliberative 26 (60.5%) 17 (39.5%) 14 (32.6%) 29 (67.4%) 
Experiential 29 (65.9%) 15 (34.1%) 19 (44.2%) 24 (55.8%) 
Affective 19 (46.3%) 22 (53.7%) 13 (30.2%) 30 (69.8%) 
Control 29 (67.4%) 14 (32.6%) 19 (44.2%) 24 (55.8%) 
  
Flu 
 Positive Negative 
 Vaccination Shot Nasal Spray Vaccination Shot Nasal Spray 
Deliberative 22 (50%) 22 (50%) 29 (67.4%) 14 (32.6%) 
Experiential 25 (58.1%) 18 (41.9%) 30 (68.2%) 14 (31.8%) 
Affective 26 (61.9%) 16 (38.1%) 24 (57.1%) 18 (42.9%) 
Control 24 (58.5%) 17 (41.5%) 32 (71.1%) 13 (28.9%) 
 
 





Frequencies and percentages for decision vignettes per age group, frame, and instruction 
condition
Lung Cancer 
 Survival Mortality 
  Surgery Radiation Surgery Radiation 
Younger 
Adults 
Deliberative 11 (64.7%) 6 (35.3%) 6 (42.9%) 8 (57.1%) 
Experiential 10 (66.7%) 5 (33.3%) 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%) 
Affective 8 (53.5%) 7 (46.7%) 3 (25.0%) 9 (75.0%) 
Control 10 (66.7%) 5 (33.3%) 9 (56.3%) 7 (43.8%) 
Middle-Aged 
Adults 
Deliberative 7 (53.8%) 6 (46.2%) 4 (26.7%) 11 (73.3%) 
Experiential 10 (66.7%) 5 (33.3%) 6 (33.3%) 12 (66.7%) 
Affective 6 (46.2%) 7 (53.8%) 7 (41.2%) 10 (58.8%) 
Control 13 (72.2%) 5 (27.8%) 3 (33.3%) 6 (66.7%) 
Older Adults 
Deliberative 8 (61.5%) 5 (38.5%) 4 (28.6%) 10 (71.4%) 
Experiential 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%) 4 (36.4%) 7 (63.6%) 
Affective 4 (33.3%) 8 (66.7%) 3 (21.4%) 11 (78.6%) 
Control 6 (60.0%) 4 (40.0%) 7 (38.9%) 11 (61.1%) 
  
Flu 
  Positive Negative 
  Vaccination 
Shot 





Deliberative 10 (55.6%) 8 (44.4%) 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%) 
Experiential 9 (69.2%) 4 (30.8%) 10 (62.5%) 6 (37.5%) 
Affective 8 (66.7%) 4 (33.3%) 9 (60.0%) 6 (40.0%) 
Control 7 (50.0%) 7 (50.0%) 14 (82.4%) 3 (17.6%) 
Middle-Aged 
Adults 
Deliberative 6 (54.5%) 5 (45.5%) 10 (58.8%) 7 (41.2%) 
Experiential 6 (33.3%) 12 (66.7%) 10 (66.7%) 5 (33.3%) 
Affective 10 (58.8%) 7 (41.2%) 6 (46.2%) 7 (53.8%) 
Control 8 (61.5%) 5 (38.5%) 11 (78.6%) 3 (21.4%) 
Older Adults 
Deliberative 6 (40.0%) 9 (60.0%) 10 (83.3%) 2 (16.7%) 
Experiential 10 (83.3%) 2 (16.7%) 10 (76.9%) 3 (23.1%) 
Affective 8 (61.5%) 5 (38.5%) 8 (61.5%) 5 (38.5%) 
Control 9 (64.3%) 5 (35.7%) 7 (50.0%) 7 (50.0%) 





Logistic regression: Lung Cancer: Age by Instruction 
Condition by Frame Interaction  





4.332 3 .228 
 
Experiential .875 .776 1.272 1 .259 2.400 
Affective -.811 .858 .893 1 .345 .444 
Control .539 .739 .532 1 .466 1.714 
Age Groups 
  
1.000 2 .607 
 
Middle-aged adults -.724 .795 .828 1 .363 .485 
Older adults -.629 .801 .616 1 .433 .533 
Survival frame .894 .741 1.455 1 .228 2.444 
Age Groups by Frame by 
Condition 
  
2.978 6 .812 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival by Experiential 
1.009 1.536 .431 1 .511 2.743 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival by Affective 
-1.302 1.570 .687 1 .407 .272 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival frame by Control 
.935 1.591 .345 1 .557 2.547 
Older adults by Survival 
frame by Experiential 
.550 1.594 .119 1 .730 1.733 
Older adults by Survival 
frame by Affective 
-1.118 1.654 .457 1 .499 .327 
Older adults by Survival 
frame by Control 
-.077 1.558 .002 1 .961 .926 
Age Groups by Frame 
  
















   
 
 
B S.E. Wald df p 
Odds 
ratio 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival frame 
.272 1.095 .062 1 .804 1.312 
Older adults by Survival 
frame 
.492 1.106 .198 1 .656 1.636 
Age Groups by Condition 
  
3.919 6 .688 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Experiential 
-.557 1.093 .260 1 .610 .573 
Middle-aged adults by 
Affective 
1.466 1.149 1.628 1 .202 4.331 
Middle-aged adults by 
Control 
-.221 1.178 .035 1 .851 .802 
Older adults by 
Experiential 
-.519 1.160 .200 1 .655 .595 
Older adults by Affective .428 1.229 .121 1 .728 1.534 
Older adults by Control -.075 1.063 .005 1 .944 .928 
Frame by Condition 
  
1.148 3 .766 
 
Survival frame by 
Experiential 
-.788 1.077 .536 1 .464 .455 
Survival frame by 
Affective 
.338 1.123 .091 1 .763 1.403 
Survival frame by Control -.452 1.050 .185 1 .667 .636 
 
 





Lung Cancer with Numeracy as a Covariate: Age by Instruction 
Condition by Frame Interaction  
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Numeracy .005 .057 .006 1 .936 1.005 
Age Groups 
  
1.001 2 .606 
 
Middle-aged adults -.723 .795 .827 1 .363 .485 
Older adults -.631 .802 .620 1 .431 .532 
Survival frame .896 .741 1.459 1 .227 2.449 
Condition 
  
4.305 3 .230 
 
Experiential .875 .776 1.272 1 .259 2.400 
Affective -.808 .859 .885 1 .347 .446 
Control .538 .739 .530 1 .466 1.713 
Age Groups by Frame by 
Condition 
  
2.969 6 .813 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival frame by Experiential 
1.006 1.537 .428 1 .513 2.734 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival frame by Affective 
-1.303 1.570 .689 1 .407 .272 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival frame by Control 
.932 1.591 .343 1 .558 2.541 
Older adults by Survival frame 
by Experiential 
.541 1.597 .115 1 .735 1.718 
       
       
       
 
 
      
 
B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Older adults by Survival frame 
by Affective 
-1.124 1.655 .461 1 .497 .325 
Older adults by Survival frame 
by Control 
-.077 1.558 .002 1 .961 .926 
Age Groups by Frame 
  
.203 2 .903 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Survival frame 
.271 1.095 .061 1 .805 1.311 
Older adults by Survival frame .497 1.108 .201 1 .654 1.643 
Age Groups by Condition 
  
3.925 6 .687 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Experiential 
-.558 1.093 .261 1 .609 .572 
Middle-aged adults by 
Affective 
1.469 1.149 1.633 1 .201 4.344 
Middle-aged adults by Control -.219 1.178 .035 1 .852 .803 
Older adults by Experiential -.518 1.160 .199 1 .655 .596 
Older adults by Affective .429 1.229 .122 1 .727 1.536 
Older adults by Control -.075 1.063 .005 1 .943 .927 
Frame by Condition 
  
1.131 3 .770 
 
Survival frame by Experiential -.784 1.078 .529 1 .467 .456 
Survival frame by Affective .336 1.124 .089 1 .765 1.399 
Survival frame by Control -.452 1.050 .185 1 .667 .637 
 





Logistic regression: Flu: Age by Instruction Condition by Frame 
Interaction  




1.897 2 .387 
 
Middle-aged adults .231 .744 .096 1 .756 1.260 
Older adults -1.022 .955 1.146 1 .284 .360 
No flu frame .365 .732 .248 1 .618 1.440 
Condition 
  
2.232 3 .526 
 
Experiential .077 .760 .010 1 .919 1.080 
Affective .182 .767 .056 1 .812 1.200 
Control -.953 .846 1.268 1 .260 .386 
Age Groups by Condition 
by Frame 
  
9.474 6 .149 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Experiential by No flu 
frame 
1.877 1.524 1.516 1 .218 6.532 
Middle-aged adults by 
Affective by No flu frame 
-.033 1.533 .000 1 .983 .968 
Middle-aged adults by 
Control by No flu frame 
-.521 1.608 .105 1 .746 .594 
Older adults by 
Experiential by No flu 
frame 
-1.756 1.754 1.002 1 .317 .173 
Older adults by Affective 
by No flu frame 
-1.363 1.648 .683 1 .408 .256 
Older adults by Control by 
No flu frame 
-3.778 1.644 5.285 1 .022* .023 
Age Groups by Frame 
  








      
 
B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Middle-aged adults by No 
flu frame 
      
Older adults by No flu 
frame 
1.650 1.189 1.926 1 .165 5.208 
Age Groups by Condition 
  
7.200 6 .303 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Experiential 
-.413 1.059 .153 1 .696 .661 
Middle-aged adults by 
Affective 
.329 1.068 .095 1 .758 1.389 
Middle-aged adults by 
Control 
.010 1.176 .000 1 .993 1.010 
Older adults by 
Experiential 
.329 1.269 .067 1 .796 1.389 
Older adults by Affective .957 1.230 .605 1 .437 2.604 
Older adults by Control 2.562 1.266 4.099 1 .043* 
12.96
3 
Condition by Frame 
  
3.338 3 .342 
 
Experiential by No flu 
frame 
-.665 1.079 .380 1 .538 .514 
Affective by No flu frame -.652 1.090 .358 1 .550 .521 
Control by No flu frame 1.176 1.108 1.127 1 .288 3.241 
Note. *p < .05





Logistic regression: Flu with Numeracy as a Covariate: Age by 
Instruction Condition by Frame Interaction  
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
 .002 .057 .002 1 .967 1.002 
Age Groups 
  
1.898 2 .387 
 
Middle-aged adults .231 .744 .096 1 .756 1.260 
Older adults -1.022 .955 1.147 1 .284 .360 
No flu frame .366 .733 .249 1 .617 1.442 
Condition 
  
2.233 3 .525 
 
Experiential .077 .760 .010 1 .919 1.081 
Affective .183 .768 .057 1 .811 1.201 
Control -.953 .846 1.269 1 .260 .386 
Age Groups by Condition 
by Frame 
  
9.475 6 .149 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Experiential by No flu 
frame 
1.873 1.527 1.506 1 .220 6.509 
Middle-aged adults by 
Affective by No flu frame 
-.032 1.533 .000 1 .983 .968 
Middle-aged adults by 
Control by No flu frame 
-.525 1.610 .106 1 .745 .592 
Older adults by 
Experiential by No flu 
frame 
-1.758 1.755 1.004 1 .316 .172 
Older adults by Affective 
by No flu frame 
-1.364 1.649 .685 1 .408 .256 
       
       
       
 
 
      
 
B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Older adults by Control by 
No flu frame 
      
Age Groups by Frame 
  
2.634 2 .268 
 
Middle-aged adults by No 
flu frame 
-.189 1.071 .031 1 .860 .827 
Older adults by No flu 
frame 
1.651 1.189 1.928 1 .165 5.214 
Age Groups by Condition 
  
7.199 6 .303 
 
Middle-aged adults by 
Experiential 
-.414 1.059 .153 1 .696 .661 
Middle-aged adults by 
Affective 
.329 1.068 .095 1 .758 1.389 
Middle-aged adults by 
Control 
.011 1.176 .000 1 .992 1.011 
Older adults by 
Experiential 
.328 1.269 .067 1 .796 1.389 
Older adults by Affective .957 1.230 .605 1 .437 2.604 
Older adults by Control 2.564 1.266 4.100 1 .043* 12.985 
Condition by Frame 
  
3.335 3 .343 
 
Experiential by No flu 
frame 
-.663 1.080 .377 1 .539 .515 
Affective by No flu frame -.652 1.090 .358 1 .550 .521 
Control by No flu frame 1.176 1.108 1.128 1 .288 3.243 





Logistic regression: Numeracy and frame for lung cancer vignette 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Numeracy -.016 .081 .038 1 .845 .984 
Survival frame .631 .952 .440 1 .507 1.880 
Survival frame 
by Numeracy 















Logistic regression: Numeracy and frame for flu vignette 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Numeracy -.063 .090 .479 1 .489 .939 
No flu frame -.481 1.001 .231 1 .631 .618 
No flu frame by 
Numeracy 
.100 .112 .784 1 .376 1.105 
 









































Figure 1. Three dimensional decision-making framework adapted from Strough, Karns, and 
Schlosnagle (2011) for this study. 
Cognitive  
Mechanics 
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Instruction Manipulation and Framing Vignettes (McNeil et al., 1982) 
 
Cancer Scenario 
[Deliberative instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only logic and reasoning 
based on the facts and numbers to make your decision on the following page.]  
[Affective instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your initial reactions and 
gut feelings to make your decision on the following page.]  
[Experiential instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your previous 
experiences and experiences of others that you are familiar with to make your decision on the 
following page.] 
[Control instructions: Please read the following scenarios and make your decision as you 
normally would.] 
 
The following contains specific information about cancer treatments at several area hospitals. 
Each hospital has its own doctors and policies regarding patient care, approaches to treatment, 
and different survival rates for the various types of treatment. For each hospital, please indicate 
whether you prefer surgery or radiation therapy. Below are general descriptions of the 
treatments.  
 
Surgery for lung cancer involves an operation on the lungs. Most patients are in the hospital for 
two to three weeks and have some pain around their incisions; they spend a month or so 
recuperating at home. After that they generally feel fine.  
 
Radiations therapy for lung cancer involves the use of radiation to kill the tumor and requires 
coming to the hospital about four times a week for 6 weeks. Each treatment takes a few minutes, 
and during the treatment patients lie on a table as if they were having an x-ray. During the course 
of treatment, some patients develop nausea and vomiting, but by the end of 6 weeks they 
generally feel fine.  
 
Thus, after the initial 6 weeks, patients treated with either surgery or radiation therapy feel about 
the same. 
 
[Deliberative instructions: Please use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers 
presented in the scenarios to make your decision.]  
[Affective instructions: Please use only your initial reactions and gut feelings to make your 
decision.] 
[Experiential instructions: Please use only your previous experiences and those of others to 
make your decision.] 
[Control instructions: Please make your decision as you normally would.] 
 
[Survival] 
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Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, 77 patients live for more than 1 year, and 23 patients 
live for more than 5 years.        
 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 68 patients live for more than 1 year, and 32 patients live for 
more than 5 years. 
 
[Mortality] 
Of 100 patients having radiation therapy, 23 patients die by 1 year and 77 patients die by 5 years.    
 
Of 100 patients having surgery, 32 patients die by 1 year and 68 patients die by 5 years.                
 
 
Would you choose radiation or surgery? 
 
 
Flu Vaccination Scenario 
[Deliberative instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only logic and reasoning 
based on the facts and numbers to make your decision on the following page.]  
[Affective instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your initial reactions and 
gut feelings to make your decision on the following page.]  
[Experiential instructions: Please read the following scenarios. Use only your previous 
experiences and experiences of others that you are familiar with to make your decision on the 
following page.] 
[Control instructions: Please read the following scenarios and make your decision as you 
normally would.] 
 
The following contains specific information about vaccinations for a new flu given at several 
area medical centers. Each medical center has its own doctors and policies regarding patient care, 
approaches to treatment, and different rates of getting the new flu. For each medical center, 
please indicate whether you prefer a vaccination shot or a nasal spray vaccination. Below are 
general descriptions of the vaccinations.  
 
The vaccination shot involves a shot given in the arm. Most patients spend about 30 minutes to 
an hour in the medical center office and have minimal pain around the area of the shot. No 
recuperation time is necessary in most cases, though some individuals may feel slightly ill for the 
duration of the day. After that they generally feel fine. 
 
The nasal spray vaccination involves a spray which patients must inhale into their nose. Most 
patients spend about an hour to an hour and a half in the medical center office and have minimal 
pain regarding the nasal spray, though a burning sensation in the nasal cavity may occur. No 
recuperation time is necessary in most cases, though the patients must stay in the medical center 
office for a period of a half an hour due to possible dizziness from the nasal spray. After this 
initial dizziness, they generally feel fine.  
 
Thus, after the initial day of the shot or nasal spray, patients treated with either feel about the 
same.  




[Deliberative instructions: Please use only logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers 
presented in the scenarios to make your decision.]  
[Affective instructions: Please use only your initial reactions and gut feelings to make your 
decision.] 
[Experiential instructions: Please use only your previous experiences and those of others to 
make your decision.] 
[Control instructions: Please make your decision as you normally would.] 
 
[Negative] 
Of 100 patients who had the vaccination shot, 23 got the new flu within month 1 and 77 got the 
new flu within 6 months.        
 
Of 100 patients who had the nasal spray vaccination, 32 got the new flu within month 1 and 68 
got the new flu within 6 months. 
 
[Positive] 
Of 100 patients who had the vaccination shot, 77 did not get the new flu within 1 month and 23 
did not get the new flu within 6 months.        
 
Of 100 patients who had the nasal spray vaccination, 68 did not get the new flu within 1 month 
and 32 did not get the new flu within 6 months.                   
 
 
Would you choose the vaccination shot or nasal spray? 


















Please indicate your marital status: 
 Never married 
 Married 
 Not married 
 Not married, but living together 
 Widow/widower 
 Divorced 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
Please indicate your age (in years; e.g. "22"): 
______________________ 
 
Please indicate your ethnicity: 
o Hispanic or Latino  
o Not Hispanic or Latino  
o Prefer not to answer 
Please indicate your race:  
o White or Caucasian 
o Black of African American 
o Asian 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
o Biracial or Multi-racial 
o Other 
o Prefer not to answer 
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What is your current employment status? 
 Employed full time 
 Employed part time 
 Partially retired (i.e., retired, but working part time) 
 Fully retired (i.e., no longer working) 
 Unemployed 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
 
Please indicate your highest education: 
 High school diploma or GED 
 Associate's degree 
 Bachelor's degree 
 Master's degree 
 Doctoral degree 
 
If you are a full-time student, how long have you been enrolled (i.e., college or a degree-





If you are currently a college student, please indicate your class status:  
 Freshman/1st year 
 Sophomore/2nd year 
 Junior/3rd year 
 Senior/4th year 
 Graduate student 
 Other (please specify) ____________________ 
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How much financial difficulty do you have paying your bills? 
 No difficulty 
 A little difficulty 
 Some difficulty 
 A great deal of difficulty 
 
Please estimate your gross income from the past 12 months (including wages, social security 
earnings, tips, etc.). 







 $70,000 or more 
 I don't know. 
 
If you are working, please indicate your current or former occupation. If you are a full-time 








In the past 5 years, how much experience have you had making medical decisions for yourself or 
others? 




 5 Much experience 
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How much training do you have in economic principles? 




 5 A lot of training 
 
How much experience do you have with the flu? 




 5 Much experience 
 
How much experience do you have with lung cancer? 




 5 Much experience 
 





As I have gotten older, my ability to make decisions is: 
 Better 
 The Same 
 Not as Good 
 
As I have gotten older, my ability to make decisions about things that affect other people is: 
 Better 
 The Same 
 Not as Good 
 
As I have gotten older, my ability to make decisions about things that affect only me is: 
 Better 
 The Same 
 Not as Good 
 




General Decision-Making Styles 
(Scott & Bruce, 1995) 
 
Instructions: Listed below are statements describing how individuals go about making important 
decisions. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement.  
 
5 point scale; 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree  
 
Rational 
1. I double-check my information sources to be sure I have the right facts before making 
decisions. 
2. I make decisions in a logical and systematic way. 
3. My decision making requires careful thought. 
4. When making a decision, I consider various options in terms of a specific goal. 
Intuition 
5. When making decisions, I rely upon my instincts. 
6. When I make decisions, I tend to rely on my intuition. 
7. I generally make decisions that feel right to me. 
8. When I make a decision, it is more important for me to feel the decision is right than to 
have a rational reason for it. 
9. When I make a decision, I trust my inner feelings and reactions. 
Dependent 
10. I often need the assistance of other people when making important decisions. 
11. I rarely make important decisions without consulting other people. 
12. If I have the support of others, it is easier for me to make important decisions. 
13. I use the advice of other people in making my important decisions. 
14. I like to have someone to steer me in the right direction when I am faced with important 
decisions. 
Avoidant 
15. I avoid making important decisions until the pressure is on. 
16. I postpone decision making whenever possible. 
17. I often procrastinate when it comes to making important decisions. 
18. I generally make important decisions at the last minute. 
19. I put off making many decisions because thinking about them makes me uneasy. 
Spontaneous  
20. I generally make snap decisions. 
21. I often make decisions on the spur of the moment 
22. I make quick decisions. 
23. I often make impulsive decisions. 
24. When making decisions, I do what seems natural at the moment. 





(Lipkus et al., 2001) 
The following questions concern the general concepts of number and probability. To the best of 
your ability, please write down your answer to each question. In case you do try to figure out but 
you still do not know an answer for a particular question, you may specify “I don’t know.”    
 
1. Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die, 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many times 
do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
Your answer: 
 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize are 1%. What is 
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each 
buy a single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
Your answer: 
 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000.  
What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
Your answer: 
 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? Please 
circle only one choice that best represents your answer. 
a. b. c. 
1 in 100 1 in 1,000  1 in 10 
5. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? Please circle only 
one choice that best represents your answer. 
a. b. c. 
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1% 10%   5% 
     
6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person B’s risk is double 
that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
Your answer:  
 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and Person B’s risk is 
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
Your answer:  
 
8. If a chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of 100? 
Your answer: 
 
9. If a chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of 1,000? 
Your answer: 
 
10.  If a chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 





11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005 out of 10,000 people, about how many of 














Resistance to Framing: Attribute Framing 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007) 
INSTRUCTIONS: Each of the following problems ask you to rate your judgment of a product or 
a situation. Each problem is presented with a scale ranging from 1 (representing one option) 
through 6 (representing the other option). For each problem, please choose the number on the 
scale that best reflects your judgment. Some items may seem similar. Answer each item with 
your judgment of the product or situation. 
 
Because of changes in tax laws, you may get back as much as $1200 in income tax. Your 
accountant has been exploring alternative ways to take advantage of this situation. He has 
developed two plans:  If Plan A is adopted, you will lose $800 of the possible $1200.  If Plan B 
is adopted, you have a 33% chance of losing none of the money, and a 67% chance of losing all 
$1200. Which plan would you use?    





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine that recent evidence has shown that a pesticide is threatening the lives of 1,200 
endangered animals.  Two response options have been suggested: If Option A is used, 600 
animals will be lost for sure. If Option B is used, there is a 75% chance that 400 animals will be 
lost, and a 25% chance that 1,200 animals will be lost. Which option do you recommend to use?  





















Imagine that your doctor tells you that you have a cancer that must be treated.  Your choices are 
as follows:        
Surgery:  Of 100 people having surgery, 90 live through the operation, and 34 are alive at the end 
of five years.       
Radiation therapy:  Of 100 people having radiation therapy, all live through the treatment, and 22 
are alive at the end of five years.  Which treatment would you choose? 





 6 Definitely would choose radiation 
 
Imagine that your client has $6,000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is 
occurring. You have two investment strategies that you can recommend under the existing 
circumstances to preserve your client’s capital. If strategy A is followed, $2,000 of your client’s 
investment will be saved. If strategy B is followed, there is a 33% chance that the entire $6,000 
will be saved, and a 67% chance that none of the principal will be saved.  Which of these two 
strategies would you favor?  





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine that recent evidence has shown that a pesticide is threatening the lives of 1,200 
endangered animals.  Two response options have been suggested: If Option A is used, 600 
animals will be saved for sure. If Option B is used, there is a 75% chance that 800 animals will 
be saved, and a 25% chance that no animals will be saved. Which option do you recommend to 
use?  
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Imagine that in one particular state it is projected that 1000 students will drop out of school 
during the next year. Two programs have been proposed to address this problem, but only one 
can be implemented. Based on other states’ experiences with the programs, estimates of the 
outcomes that can be expected from each program can be made. Assume for purposes of this 
decision that these estimates of the outcomes are accurate and are as follows: If Program A is 
adopted, 400 of the 1000 students will stay in school.  If Program B is adopted, there is a 40% 
chance that all 1000 students will stay in school and 60% chance that none of the 1000 students 
will stay in school.  Which program would you favor for implementation?       





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine that your doctor tells you that you have a cancer that must be treated.  Your choices are 
as follows:   
Surgery:  Of 100 people having surgery, 10 die because of the operation, and 66 die by the end 
of five years.   
Radiation therapy:  Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die during the treatment, and 
78 die by the end of five years. Which treatment would you choose? 





 6 Definitely would choose radiation 
 
Imagine a hospital is treating 32 injured soldiers, who are all expected to lose one leg.  There are 
two doctors that can help the soldiers, but only one can be hired: If Doctor A is hired, 20 soldiers 
will keep both legs. If Doctor B is hired, there is a 63% chance that all soldiers keep both legs 
and a 37% chance that nobody will save both legs. Which doctor do you recommend?         
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program 
A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is a 33% chance that 600 
people will be saved, and a 67% chance that no people will be saved. Which program do you 
recommend to use?         





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine that your client has $6,000 invested in the stock market. A downturn in the economy is 
occurring. You have two investment strategies that you can recommend under the existing 
circumstances to preserve your client’s capital. If strategy A is followed, $4,000 of your client’s 
investment will be lost. If strategy B is followed, there is a 33% chance that the nothing will be 
lost, and a 67% chance that $6,000 will be lost. Which of these two strategies would you favor?  





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine that in one particular state it is projected that 1000 students will drop out of school 
during the next year. Two programs have been proposed to address this problem, but only one 
can be implemented. Based on other states’ experiences with the programs, estimates of the 
outcomes that can be expected from each program can be made. Assume for purposes of this 
decision that these estimates of the outcomes are accurate and are as follows: If Program A is 
adopted, 600 of the 1000 students will drop out of school. If Program B is adopted, there is a 
40% chance that none of the 1000 students will drop out of school and 60% chance that all 1000 
students will drop out of school.  Which program would you favor for implementation?   
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Because of changes in tax laws, you may get back as much as $1200 in income tax. Your 
accountant has been exploring alternative ways to take advantage of this situation. He has 
developed two plans:  If Plan A is adopted, you will get back $400 of the possible $1200.  If Plan 
B is adopted, you have a 33% chance of getting back all $1200, and a 67% chance of getting 
back no money.  Which plan would you use?        





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume 
that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program 
A is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program B is adopted, there is a 33% chance that nobody 
will die, and a 67% chance that 600 people will die. Which program do you recommend to 
use?         





 6 Definitely would choose B 
 
Imagine a hospital is treating 32 injured soldiers, who are all expected to lose one leg.  There are 
two doctors that can help the soldiers, but only one can be hired: If Doctor A is hired, 12 soldiers 
will lose one leg. If Doctor B is hired, there is a 63% chance that nobody loses a leg and a 37% 
chance that all lose a leg. Which doctor do you recommend?         














Consideration of Future Consequences 
(Strathman et al., 1994) 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of 
you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) please write a "1" 
to the left of the question; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you (very much like you) 
please write a "5" next to the question. And, of course, use the numbers in the middle if you fall 
between the extremes. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements 
below. 
 
1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic 
 
1.  I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my day to 
day behavior. 
2.  Often I engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not result for 
many years. 
3.  I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring the future will take care of itself. 
4.  My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (i.e., a matter of days or weeks) outcomes 
of my actions. 
5.  My convenience is a big factor in the decisions I make or the actions I take. 
6.  I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve future 
outcomes. 
7.  I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously even if the negative 
outcome will not occur for many years. 
8.  I think it is more important to perform a behavior with important distant consequences than a 
behavior with less-important immediate consequences. 
9. I generally ignore warnings about possible future problems because I think the problems will 
be resolved before they reach crisis level. 
10.  I think that sacrificing now is usually unnecessary since future outcomes can be dealt with at 
a later time. 
11.  I only act to satisfy immediate concerns, figuring that I will take care of future problems that 
may occur at a later date. 
12.  Since my day to day work has specific outcomes, it is more important to me than behavior 
that has distant outcomes. 
 
 




Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick, 2005) 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much 
does the ball cost? 
 _______ cents 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 
to make 100 widgets? 
 _______ minutes 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake?  
________ days 




Manipulation Check & Short- vs. Long-Term Information Questions 
Manipulation Check: 
To what extent did you use logic and reasoning based on the facts and numbers in the decision 
situation to make your decision? 




 5 A great deal 
 
To what extent did you use your gut feelings and initial reactions to make your decision? 




 5 A great deal 
 
To what extent did you use your previous experiences or those of others to make your decision? 




 5 A great deal 
 
Short- vs. Long-term Information: 
How important was the short-term information (i.e., the number of people who got the flu or did 
not get the flu within 1 month) to you in your decision making? 




 5 Very important 
How important was the long-term information (i.e., the number of people who got the flu or did 
not get the flu within 6 months) to you in your decision making? 




 5 Very important 
 




Logistic Regression Models for Individual Predictors 
Instruction Condition 
 Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed with frame (survival vs. mortality) 
and instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors and 
decision choice (surgery or radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the outcome. The full model 
was significant, χ
2
(7, N = 342) = 25.27, p = .001 (Cox and Snell R Square, 6.1%; Nagelkerke R 
Square, 8.2%), indicating that the model significantly distinguished between participants who 
indicated they would choose surgery and participants who indicated they would choose radiation. 
The model correctly classified 62.1% of cases. Frame was a significant predictor of decision 
outcome with an odds ratio of 3.17 (see Table 1a). This indicates that participants who were in 
the survival condition were over 3 times as likely to indicate that they would choose surgery over 
radiation as participants in the mortality frame. Instruction condition and the interaction between 
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Table 1a 
Logistic regression: Lung cancer: Frame and Instruction Condition 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
Ratio 
Survival frame 1.153 .451 6.544 1 .011 3.168 
Deliberative   3.017 3 .389  
Experiential .495 .447 1.222 1 .269 1.640 
Affective -.108 .465 .054 1 .816 .898 








-.260 .631 .170 1 .680 .771 
Survival frame 
by Affective 
-.463 .642 .522 1 .470 .629 
Survival frame 
by Control 
-.191 .635 .091 1 .763 .826 
  
Flu. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the flu or not get the flu) and 
instruction condition (deliberative, experiential, affective, and control) as predictors and decision 
choice (vaccination shot or nasal spray) for flu prevention as the outcome. The full model was 
not significant, χ
2
(7, N = 344) = 6.41, p = .49 (Cox and Snell R Square, 6.1%; Nagelkerke R 
Square, 8.2%).  The model correctly classified 61.6% of cases. Frame, instruction condition, and 











Logistic regression: Flu: Frame and Instruction Condition 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Deliberative   2.105 3 .551  
Experiential -.034 .459 .005 1 .941 .967 
Affective .441 .451 .955 1 .328 1.554 
Control -.173 .463 .139 1 .709 .842 




2.464 3 .482 
 
Experiential by 
No flu frame 
-.295 .630 .219 1 .640 .745 
Affective by No 
flu frame 
-.926 .628 2.171 1 .141 .396 
Control by No 
flu frame 




 Lung cancer. A logistic regression was performed with frame (survival vs. mortality) 
and age (younger, middle-aged, and older adults) as predictors and decision choice (surgery or 
radiation) for lung cancer treatment as the outcome. The full model was significant, χ
2
(5, N = 
342) = 21.61, p < .001 (Cox and Snell R Square, 6.1%; Nagelkerke R Square, 8.2%), indicating 
that the model significantly distinguished between participants who indicated they would choose 
surgery and participants who indicated they would choose radiation. The model correctly 
classified 61.2% of cases. However, neither frame nor age was a significant predictor of decision 
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Table 2a 
Logistic regression: Lung cancer: Age and Frame 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Age Groups   3.855 2 .146  
Middle-aged 
adults 
-.596 .384 2.417 1 .120 .551 
Older adults -.702 .391 3.224 1 .073 .496 
Survival frame .600 .375 2.556 1 .110 1.821 
Age Groups by 
Frame 
  





.516 .536 .927 1 .336 1.676 
Older adults by 
Survival frame 
.378 .552 .471 1 .493 1.460 
 
 
 Flu. A logistic regression was performed with frame (get the flu or not get the flu), age 
(younger, middle-aged, and older adults) as predictors and decision choice (vaccination shot or 
nasal spray) for flu prevention as the outcome. The full model was not significant, χ
2
(5, N = 343) 
= 4.68, p = .46.  The model explained between 1.4% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 1.8% 
(Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in decision outcome and correctly classified 61.5% of 











Logistic regression: Flu: Age and Frame 
 B S.E. Wald df p Odds 
ratio 
Age Groups   .406 2 .816  
Middle-aged 
adults 
.222 .382 .337 1 .562 1.249 
Older adults .020 .402 .002 1 .961 1.020 
No flu frame .351 .383 .840 1 .359 1.421 
Age Groups by 
Frame 
  
.158 2 .924 
 
Middle-aged 
adults by No flu 
frame 
.135 .536 .063 1 .801 1.144 
Older adults by 
No flu frame 
-.081 .559 .021 1 .885 .922 
 
 
 
 
